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A t  your request, LARO's Program Support Unit has prepared the enclosed briefing 
on the Andean Pact Agreement. 
'The impact that recent developments have had on the Agreement's ini t ial  philo- 
sophy has stimulated an open debate among the member countries during the last 
two months. The PSU staff has benefitted greatly from this debate as i t  coin- 
cides with the task at hand. This staff attended a fu l l  course (and even got an 
attendance diplomd!!) organized by Fedesarrollo. A t  the course they were ex- 
posed to discussions presented by high level lecturers both from inside and outside 
the public sector. - 
In addition to the course, Fedesarrollo published an analytical magazine i n  November 
prepared i n  coordination with Chilean and Ecuadorian institutions. From that vol- 
ume we have selected part of  the material used i n  the enclosed brief. 
Other sources have recently provided information; among these ANlF (National 
Association of  Financing Agencies) and Nueva Frontera, a specialized lacal weekly 
magazine from which we quote information i n  our work. 
In brief, your interest i n  this matter gave LARO the opportunity to study and un- 
derstand a highly significant and current issue for the region: the feasibility of 
integration, of forming blocks to face common ~roblerns. I n  spite of the present 
crisis (which i s  rooted both i n  polit ical and economic differences) the integration 
process i s  worth defending and fostering: i t  includes social and cultural side ef- 
fects in  the relations among the countries o f  the region - other than commercial 
activities which have evidently increased. 
Regarding our work, we face a problem, that is, knowing how knowledgeable 
each of  you i s  on the Agreement. Perhaps the ini t ial  descriptive charts w i l l  
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seem a b i t  too obvious. However, we thought that i n  order to understand the 
p$ocess, and the c r i s i s ,  we had to start from the very beginning. 
'The document includes: 
I) A set o f  charts describing origins; strategy o f  development underlying the 
Agreement; instruments and mechanisms developed by it; ach ievements; pre- 
sent situation after the modifications established i n  Decision 100 and 103 o f  
last November. 
2) Excerpfs of a core article extracfed from 'C~yun:ura Econ6rr,ica1' entitled 'Sorne -. -
Questions on the Perspectives of the Andean Group', presented along with the 
opinions from other sources, it includes comparative graphs on the economic 
situation o f  each country. 
3) A summary o f  each country's internal economic situation and perspectives in-  
cluded as an annex to facilitate the understanding of particular problems of  
the mem ber (and ex-member) countries. 
/' 
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Seven years  have passed s ince  t h e  signing of t h e  Cartagena Agreement, and 
t he  Andean Subregional Group faces e c r i s i s  t h a t  th rea tens  t h e  cont inui ty  of 
i ts  purposes and t h e  success of i t s  programs .' FEDESARROUO, Jo in t l y  with the  
Department of Economics of t h e  University of Chile and t h e  Foundation f o r  Edu- 
cat ion and Development of Ecuador, have considered it timely t o  analyze t h e  
economic juncture o f  t h e  countries of t he  Andean Group, as wel l  es t h e i r  pres- 
ent  development s t r a t e g i e s ,  i n  order t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a  b e t t e r  utiderstanding of 
L - bile prob!.em faced Ly i i ie integreting pr.ocer:s. These jrcl3le:c ster r e jn ly  frcr- 
the  differences of economic s t ruc tu r e  among t h e  countr ies ,  the  d i f f e r en t  manner 
i n  which t h e i r  economies evolve i n  t h e  shor t  term, and t h e  di f ference i n  t he  
economic po l i c i e s  adopted t o  s a t i s f y  objectives on which t he  verious govern- 
ments frequently are not i n  agreement. 
The development s t ra tegy  impl ic i t  i n  t h e  Cartsgena Agreemnt was based on 
an extended s u b s t i t u t i o n  policy of imports, of s e c t o r i a l  ~ r o g r d n g ,  end of 
con t ro l  t o  foreign investment, a s t r a t egy  t o  which some of t he  present objec- 
t i v e s  of t he  economic policy of c e r t a in  countries do not conform. I n  t h e  case 
of Colonbia, the  government i s  opposed t o  an excessively high ;rotection of t he  
i n d u s t r i a l  sec tor .  In tu rn ,  t he  Chilesn government has a l s o  objected t o  t he  
agreements r e l a t i n g  t o  the  common foreign t a r i f f s  with a high e f f ec t i ve  protec- 
t i o n  percentage, a s  wel l  as those  per ta ining t o  t h e  t r ea t aen t  of fore ign cap i ta l .  
Pa r t i cu l a r l y  i n  t h e  case  of Chile,  t h e  governrcent has adopted a  development 
s t r a t e ~ r  openly opposed t o  t h e  s p i r i t  of t he  Pact ,  a s  it was conceived years 
back. Furthermore, i n  connection with s e c t o r i a l  programming, t he  countries 
have not succeeded i n  an agreement during t h e  an t i c ipa t ed  t e r n .  Undoubtedly 
t h e  di f ferences  among the  members of t he  Pact as  t o  means and eim m k e  dubious 
t he  f e a s i b i l i t y  of a n  in tegra t ion  process excessively axbit ious i n  i t s  i n i t i a l  
purposes. 
* 
Translated from t h e  Ar t i c l e  "Some Questions on the  Perspectives of t h e  Padean 
Group" - Coyunture Econ6mica Quer te r ly ,  FEDESAPROLLO, Bogot6, October, 1976. 
The enormous dependency on a few primary products o f  export is  a comon 
denominator t o  t h e  s ix  economies. I n  Venezuela, o i l  determines t h e  bas ic  s t ruc-  
L 
t u r e  of i ts  economy, generates t he  g r ea t e s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  government's 
income and almost t h e  t o t a l i t y  of fore ign ex$hange. I n  Ecuador, o i l  and bana- 
nas a r e  t h e  main source of foreign exchange and e l s o  represent  an important 
port ion of public income. I n  Colombia, t h e  evolution of t h e  p r i c e  of coffee  on 
t h e  world market has a great  incidence on t h e  goverment ' s  foreign,  monetary 
and f i s c a l  po l i c i e s ,  a s  we l l  as on t he  general  economic a c t i v i t y .  I n  Chile, 
copper plays a s im i l a r  r o l e .  I n  Peru, more than in any o ther  country of t he  
subregioc,  the re  i s  soae diversification of primary exyorc p ro iuc t s ,  but  f i sh-  
ing and mining a r e  t h e  two main sources of foreign exchange. F ina l ly ,  Bolivia 
i s  g rea t ly  dependent on production and exportat ion of t i n  end o i l .  
The above expleins i n  p a r t  t he  f luctuations of t h e  economies of t h e  s i x  
countries.  The rise i n  o i l  p r i c e s  i n  1974 represented a very important change 
i n  t h e  economy of t h r e e  of the  countr ies  of t he  subregion: Venezuela increased 
i n  very high proport ions i t s  c a p i t a l  resources;  Bol iv ia ,  f ~ r  t h e  f i r s t  time i n  
many years ,  r eg i s t e r ed  a. surplus  i n  i t s  balance of payments and a savings l e v e l  
which permitted t h e  f inancing of increas ing investment l e v e l s ;  Ecuador could 
accelera te  i t s  development programs and increase  subs t an t i a l l y  i t s  r a t e  of 
economic growth. Colombia, a f t e r  i ts  exchange d i f f i c u l t i e s  during 1975, ex- 
perienced a s imi la r  t u r n  i n  1976 t o  t h a t  of  the  OPEP countr ies  due t o  t h e  
rapid increase i n  cof fee  p r ices .  I n  con t r a s t ,  Chile and Peru have faced problem 
i n  t h e i r  balance of payments associa ted with t he  drop i n  copper p r i c e s ,  t he  
anchovy ("anchoveta") c r i s i s  and t h e  decrease i n  demand of o ther  export products. 
The di rect ions  of t h e  governments' commercial po l i c i e s  i n  t h e  various szb- 
regional  countries have shown diverging tendencies. Colombie hes l i b e r a t e d  
inrportetions, t r y i n g  t o  improve i n d u s t r i a l  ef f ic iency and a s  a r e l i e f  t o  i n f l a -  
t ionary  pressures.  Likewise, Chile, i n  s p i t e  of f i n ~ n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  has 
seeked s imi la r  goals by means of low t a r i f f  l eve l s .  Venezuelz, on t h e  ccntrary ,  
intends t o  d i v e r s i e  i t s  econony through a very high t m i f f  p ro tec t ion .  Peru 
faces a d i f f i c u l t  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  and has adopted a pol icy  of high t a r i f f s  
and non-tariff  b a r r i e r s ,  prohibi t ions  and l i censes .  Bolivia and Ecuador, favored 
by t h e  Subregional Agreement as countr ies  with a r e l a t i v e l y  lower economic de- 
velqpment, maintain a high protect ion of  t h e i r  i nc ip i en t  indust ry ,  although 
they have witnessed t h e  erosion of p a r t  of  t h e i r  o i l  p r o f i t s  i n  importation 
l e v e l s  f o r  more t h a n  double those p reva i l ing  i n  1973. 
During 1975 t h e  recession of  i ndus t r i a l i z ed  countr ies  brought as conse- 
quence a de t e r i o r a t i on  i n  t h e  subregional exchange terms which a f fec ted  i n  a 
grea te r  degree t h e  non-oil producing countries.  Simultaneously, i n f l a t i ona ry  
7ressures  d i ~ i n i s h e d ,  2ue t o  the  increese  of intcrns4; ior .a l  re..??-res, xhen e l l  
countr ies ,  with t h e  exception of Venezuela and Peru, adopted r e s t r i c t i v e  Eon- 
e ta ry  po l ic ies .  I n  Venezuela, t h e  government has es tab l i shed  a system of  
subsidies  t o  t h e  consumer which d id  o f f s e t ,  at l e a s t  i n  t he  shor t  term, t he  
poss ible  e f f ec t s  o f  an  excessively rap id  increase  i n  t h e  loeacs of  p a p e n t .  I n  
the  case of Peru, t h e  government has been forced t o  change i t s  pol icy  of p r i c e  
con t ro l s  and subs id ies  t o  t h e  consumer due t o  i t s  incompetence t o  absorb impl ic i t  
cos ts  and t o  t he  need t o  devaluate t h e i r  Sol i n  t h e  presence of f i nenc i a l  dis-  
order i n  t h e  ex t e rna l  s ec to r  of t h e  economy. 
I n  1975, then,  t he r e  w a s  a reduction of i n f l a t i ona ry  r a t e s  i n  comparison - 
with t h e  high l e v e l s  o f t h e  years  1973 and 1974. Only i n  Peru, an acce le ra t i cn  
i n  t h e  rhythm of inc rease  i n  p r ices  was observed, which seems t o  have accentuated 
during t h e  current  year.  The tendency towards lower i n f l a t i ona ry  r a t e s  i s  main- 
t a i n e d  i n  t h e  case  of Ecuador end Bol ivia ,  where r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary and f i s c a l  
po l i c i e s  an t i c i pa t e  a minor i n f l a t i o n  i n  1976. I n  Chile,  t h e  government continues 
with r e l a t i v e  success t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  policy s t a r t e d  i n  1974. I n  t u r n ,  i n  Co- 
lombia, a g ree te r  increase  i n  t h e  p r i c e  index i s  projected f o r  t h e  present  year 
a s  t h e  consequence o f  t h e  increase  i n  i n t e rna t i ona l  reserves  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  
coffee  prosper i ty ,  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  policy of con t ro l  i n  publ ic  expenses end t he  
r e s t r i c t i o n  of  c r e d i t  t o  individuals.  
I n  1975, t h e  reduct ion of  fore ign t r ade  and t h e  smal ler  i n f l a t i ona ry  r a t e s  
were ecco~lipanied by a minor economic increase  i n  a l l  coun t r i es ,  pa r t i cu l a r l y  i n  
Chile where a decrease i n  t h e  i n t e rna l  gross p r ~ d u c t  w a s  r eg i s te red .  However, 
the perspectives f o r  1976 a r e  more favorable mainly due t o  the  recovery of ex- 
te rna l  prices fo r  some of t he  primary export p r o d ~ c t s  of t he  subregion. In 
th ib  regard, t he  most favoured countries,  with t he  exception of Venezuela and 
Ecuador, were Colombia and Bolivia. I n  Chile a slow process of economic reac- 
t iva t ion  is r e i n i t i a t e d  i n  1975, while i n  perk, the  perspectives are  l e s s  
promising due t o  t h e  government's need t o  balance i ts  budget, t o  solve the  
de f i c i t  s i tua t ion  shown by the  balance of payments, and t o  reduce the  i n f l a -  
tionary ra te .  
GRAPH 1 
RATES OF ACTUAL GROWTH OF 
THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1971- 1975' 
Source: FEDESARROLLO 
* Preliminary estimofes. 
I /  
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BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTIOIV OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMEXT 
L 
1. The Andean Group within t h e  process of Latin American Integretlol?. 
The Cartagena Agreement w a s  born because of a  pa r a ly s i s  i n  t h e  process 
- - 
of Latin American i n t e g r a t i o n  which took place i n  t h e  context  of t he  k t i n  
American Free Trade Associet ion (LPLFTA). Such para lys i s  was due, i n  p a t ,  t o  
t he  inadequacy of t h e  mechanisms foreseen by t h e  Montevideo ~ r e a t ~ ~ l ,  eanb, i n  
p a r t ,  t o  the  bel ieve  most pa r t i c i pa t i ng  nations of  t h e  region hed, thr-i t h e  
process was concentrat ing i ts benef i t s  on t h e  iergest  c o w t r i e c  c f  xk-e E T C E :  
Argentina, Braz i l  and Mexico. 
The posi t ion of  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l e s s  developed countr ies  w e s  b s e d  ca t h e  
b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  t a x  re lease  on in te r reg iona l  t r a d e  would prosuce m i l~ t e r e l  
e f f ec t s  benef i t ing  t hose  countr ies  with a  more complete i n d u s t r i d  fcw-de.ticri 
and t h a t ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  ( in  order  t o  o f f se t  t h i s  concentrat ing tender-cy m d  okte in  
a  f a i r  pa r t i c i pa t i on  of t h e  Member Countries i n  t h e  i n t eg ra t i on  Frocess) ,  
spec ia l  emphasis w a s  required i n  t h e  loca t ion  of indus t r i es  with direct m d  
i / ind i rec t  e f fec t s  powerful t o  t h e  econoq  of s s i d  countries- . n - t s  x&s, p e r k q s ,  
t h e  fundmental  cause of t h e  ser ious  obstacles  faced by t h e  process of t a x  r e  
l e a s e  i n s ide  LEiFTA. 
Thus, i n  August 1366, t h e  Pres idents  of Colombia, Chi le  a ~ d  Venezuela, w-d 
t h e  personal delegates  of t h e  Pres idents  of Ecuador and Peru gEthered 
' i n  Bogota, recommended "within t h e  fr&ework of  t h e  Treaty:- a) .To 
1/ The t r e e t y  which es tab l i shed  t h e  LhFTA was signed by seven c c m t r i e s  io - 
Montevideo i n  1960 and subsequently adhered t o  by four  e d d i t i o z d  countries 
i n  t h e  area.  
21 No theo re t i c a l  ana lys i s  of t h i s  idea  i s  included, s i nce  it is  not  k - f t h l ~  - 
t h e  scope of  t h i s  essay. The i n t e r e s t ed  reader msy lcok ~ p ,  a c a g  c the r s ,  
t he  following: Salgado G . ,  " E l  Desarrollo y l a  Integraci6n de k c r i c e  U- 
t ina" ,  0. Sunkel (ed . ) .  "Integration P o l i t i c a  y ~conEmiciz," E2 i t o r i e l  U S -  
I?  vers i tar ia ,  Santia,go 1970 ,\rm. &?-121; a~.lld G e r q r ,  L 7 ~ i .  Jorge, er- 
I 
!, yretaci6n t e 6 r i c a  de l a  Integraci6n Econ6rnic~. entre ~ a . i s e s  Sl:hdes~.rrcll3r.- 
i 
i 20s. La Experiencia de2 Grupo Andino". mimeo. Bogotg. JuEe. 1976. 
car ry  out complementary agreements and s p e c i a l  temporary concessions of com- 
mercial  exchange ... c )  t o  e s t ab l i sh  d i f f e r e n t i a l  systems of t a x  r e l e a se ,  
3 r e l a t i v e  t o  t he  d i f f e r e n t  l eve l s  of development. . . " -I 
Subsequently, i n  t h e  Declaration of t h e  American Pres idents ,  subscribed 
i n  t h e  Meeting o f  Heads of t h e  American S t a t e s  a t  Punta de l  Este ,  on Apri l  1 4 ,  
1967, it i s  recommended, based on t h e  request  from t h e  countr ies  with a minor 
r e l a t i v e  economical development and on t h e  r e s u l t s  achieved i n  LAFTA's integra- 
A . ~ c n  process,  t h a t  the receszaqr  neesures Ce tzken t c  iz iplecent  the foLloving 
decis ions:  "a) To acce le ra te  LAFTA1s conversion process i n t o  a con;mon market... 
b )  To coordinate progressively economic po l i c i e s  and instruments as it i s  re- 
quired by t h e  i n t eg ra t i on  process..  . c )  To p r o p i t i a t e  t h e  concentrat ion of 
s e c t o r i a l  agreements of indust  r i d  complementation obtaining t h e  pa r t i c i pa t i on  
of countr ies  of r e l a t i v e l y  minor economic development. d )  To p r o p i t i a t e  sub- 
regional  agreements, of a  t r a n s i t o r y  nature ,  with i n t e r n a l  systems of t a x  re- 
l e a s e  and adjustment of treatments t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  i n  a more accelera ted form 
than general  commitments and which should be  compatible with t h e  object ive  of 
regional  i n t eg r a t i on  ... Countries of r e l a t i v e l y  minor economic development w i l l  
have t h e  r i g h t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  and ob ta in  p r e f e r en t i a l  condit ions i n  t h e  sub- - 
4 / regional  agreements of i n t e r e s t  t o  them. . . 'I- 
On May 26, 1969, t h e  Andean Subregional In tegra t ion  Agreement was signed, 
being it a consequence of :  a) t he  ineffect iveness  of t h e  s e c t o r i a l  agreements 
of i n d u s t r i d  complementation, as a d i s t r i bu t i on  mechanism of bene f i t s  i n  fever 
of t h e  countries wi th  i n su f f i c i en t  markets, b )  t he  consequent s tagnat ion of 
LAETA'S in tegra t ion  process, and c )  given t h e  provision contained i n  t h e  Pres- 
i den t s '  Declaration r e l a t i n g  t o  subregional  agreements. The main object ives  are :  
71 . . . a) t o  promote t h e  balanced and harmonious development of t he  Member Coun- 
t r i e s .  b) t o  acce le ra te  t h e i r  development by means of economic in tegra t ion ,  -9 
31 - ~ o g o t &  Declarat ion,  Eogota, August 16 ,  1976. Our underl ines.  
4 / - Declarat ion of Pres idents  of h e r i c a ,  "Prcgrama de Acci6n1', Chapter I. 2, 
Punta d e l  Este, Apr i l  1 4 ,  1967- O u r  underl ines.  
c )  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e i r  pa r t i c i pa t i on  i n  t h e  i n t eg ra t i on  process foreseen i n  t he  
Montevideo Treaty and d) t o  e s t ab l i sh  favorable cond i t io r s  f o r  t h e  conversicn 
of LAFTA i n t o  a common market, e)  a l l  t h e  above, aiming t o  achieve a pe r s i s t en t  
11  L/ improvement i n  t h e  standard of l i v i n g  of t h e  5nhabi tents  of t h e  Subregion . 
From the r e ,  an agreement of economic in tegra t ion  p a r t i c u l a r l y  ambitious and 
imaginative sprout .  The Agreement contempleted t h e  so lu t i on  of t h e  m i n  obsta- 
c les  encountered by LAFTA; disposed of mechanisms t o  achieve a s a t i s f ac to ry  
titularly with respec t  t o  t h e  signing nations of r e l a t i v e l y  .minor development : 
Bolivia and Ecuedor; created organism with supranational  c h a e c t e r :  t h e  Bond  
and t h e  P o l i t i c a l  C o d s s i o n ;  prescr ibed ccncrete time-tebles t o  t ake  a substan- 
t i a l  number of J o i n t  decisions;  designed some mechanisms of automatic eppl ica t ion 
t o  reduce t h e  danger of having in te r rup t ions  i n  t h e  process;  mong these  mecha- 
nisms t h e  t a x  re lease  may be pointed out. Ifevertheless, vhat permitted 
t he  c rea t ion  of a p a r t i c u l a r l y  ambitious process w a s  t h e  coincidence of t h e  sign- 
ing  governments on some bas ic  p r inc ip les  of a comon s t r a t egy  of economic develop- 
ment, f o r  which t h e  subregional in tegra t ion  process w a s  pa r t i cu l a r l y  important. 
- 
THE IIPLICIT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY I N  TEE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT 
The Cartagena Agreement r e s t s  on t h e  impl ic i t  conception o f  e s t r a t egy  of 
economic development with some fundamental goals ,  among others  : t h e  accelera t ion 
of development of t h e  Member Countries i n  condit ions of  equity;  t he  increase  of 
employment l eve l s ;  t h e  improvement i n  t h e  pos i t ion  of t h e  Elenber Countries from 
t h e  standpoint  fore ign t rade;  and, t h e  b e t t e r  u t i l i z e t i c n  of technological  
advances, ( a s  provided fo r  i n  Ar t i c l e  25 of t he  ~ ~ r e e m e n t ) .  A pstr t icular  i n t e q r e -  
t a t i o n  of t h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  t h a t  which guided t h e  p r o g r d n g  of t h e  Board during t he  
f i r s t  s ix  years of t h e  process% i s  contained i n  t h e  docment "General Bases f o r  
a Subregional St ra tegy of Development", and ccnsiders as a "besic r e q u i s i t e  f o r  
A r t i c l e  1 of t h e  Cartagens Agreement. 
61 Board of Cartagena Agreement, Ib id .  , pp. 13-17. 
t h i s  new s t y l e  of development t h e  subs t an t i a l  increase i n  t h e  r a t e  of growth of 
the  economy i n  order  t o  permit and f a c i l i t a t e  s t r u c t u r a l  changes. This high 
r ~ t e  should be fundamentally based on a new indus t r i a l i za t i on  model feas ib le  
I\ 
through integrat ion.  .?3/ The achievement of tn is  basic  r equ i s i t e  requires main- 
l y ,  according t o  t h e  impl ic i t  diagnosis i n  s a id  s t r a t e g y , /  t ha t :  
a. Accelerated i ndus t r i a l i za t i on  should take  t h e  leading pa r t  i n  t h e  
economic development . 
b. The s a id  accelerated i ndus t r i a l i za t i on  be achieved by means of a  pro- 
cess of anp l i f i ed  subs t i t u t i on  of imports, with emphasis on those manufactures 
known es besic ,  allowed by t h e  creat ion of a  more ample market. Actually, t he  
extended market would allow t o  b e t t e r  u t i l i z e  s ca l e  economies, generally present 
i n  these indus t r ies  and consequently, t o  achieve t he  subs t i tu t ion  of imports 
of t h e i r  products more e f f i c i e n t l y  than i f  each country would do it individually.  
c. A c ruc ia l  r o l e  b e  given t o  government par t i c ipa t ion  and t o  d i r ec t  
foreign investment i n  t h i s  process of indus t r ia l i za t ion .  I n  f a c t ,  it was con- 
sidered t h a t  the  process demanded a  s t rong a c t i v i t y  of i n t e r n a l  savings. This - 
f ac t ,  added t o  t h e  requirements of great  long term and high r i s k  investments i n  
besic industr ies  that; normally a r e  not taken care  of by t h e  nat ional  p r iva te  
cap i t a l ,  denmded an ac t i ve  and determinant r o l e  on t h e  par t  of t h e  governments 
i n  t he  an t ic ipa ted  i ndus t r i a l i za t i on  process. Furthermore, it i s  suppcsed t h a t  
governments would have en e f fec t ive  par t ic ipa t ion  i n  t h e  process of conception, 
development and execution of s e c t o r i a l  development plans ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly  i n  those 
i ndus t r i a l  sectors  t o  be pro~rsnmed. Final ly ,  foreign d i r ec t  investment was 
required for  t he  necessary t e c h n o l o ~ i c a l  contributions t o  "close t he  forei&n ex- 
change gap" t h a t ,  a t  t h a t  t i n e ,  was considered a s  a  s t r u c t u r a l  problem of Letin 
American economies; and t o  contr ibute  with t he  " r i sk  cap i ta l "  required by t h e  
desired i n d c s t r i a l  investments. 
7' Board of Cartagena &reement. " ~ a s e s  Generales para una Es t re teg ia  Subregio- 
n a l  de Desarrollo" . Resumen, Lima, 1972, p. 6. 
r 
81 A theore t ica l  ana lys i s  i s  included on t h e  diegnosis and s t ra tegy of t h e  
corresponding development i n :  Garay, Luis Jorge, I b i d ,  1976. 
d. A common and r e s t r i c t i v e  treatment t o  f o r e i m  c a p i t a l  and t o  t h e  - tech- 
nolcgical t rans fe r  was pa r t i cu l a r ly  required (although any in tegra t ion  process 
6. 
demands a common treatment t o  foreign investment t o  avoid t he  dangerous compe- 
t i t i o n  of t h e  Kember Countries t o  a t t r a c t  it t o  t h e i r  own t e r r i t o r y ) .  Actually 
t h e  indus t r ia l  p ro tec t ion  s t ra tegy  ( a t  l e ~ s t  i n  ce r t a in  i n d u s t r i a l  sectors  ) would 
concentrate a great  deal  of t h e  gross benef i ts  of t h e  in tegra t ion  process i n  t h e  
hands of t he  protected i ndus t r i a l  producers21 Since t h e  s t ra tegy  would imply es 
impcrtant par t i c ipa t ion  of foreign investment i n  these  sec tors ,  it was imperative 
t o  assure t h a t  t he  foreign cap i t a l  would not monopolize s a i d  benef i t s  and trens- 
fey them totizLly akrced.  Trlur, zhe requlrexer-z of 51% cf c t r i o ~ e l  ~sst:cSpe,t:ou 
i n  an enterpr ise  with foreign investment (provided tha t  such proportion r e f l e c t s  
i t s e l f  i n  the  technica l ,  f inanc ia l ,  administrat ive and commercial management i n  
accordance with Decision 2b), may be interpreted i n  p a r t ,  a s  a mechanism t o  seek 
' t h a t  a t  l e a s t  50% of the  gross benef i t s  of the  process remain i r i  t h e  subregio$&/. 
The l i m i t  es tabl ished f o r  t h e  remittance of p ro f i t s  intends t o  re inforce  t h e  
t i v e  and a f f l c l e n t  tragSfer . . mentioned objectives . On t h e  other hand, the  m e c  
of t e  -results dec i s ive  f o r  the  proposed s t ra tegy ,  and t h e  nat ional  control  
of -foreign investments a lso  leads  t o  t h i s  end, as wel l  as  other  spec i f ic  provisions 
of Decision 24 and of Decisions 84 and 85. 
e. The niovement of cap i t a l s  i n  t h e  subregion t o  carry  out i ndus t r i a l  invest- 
ments be expedited, as a complement t o  the  act ion of government par t i c ipa t ion  
and of t h e  foreign investment. 
e/ Although there  a r e  other  s o c i a l  benef i t s  obtained by the  government ( i n  the  
form of t axes ) ,  by t h e  working c lass  (through t h e  e f f ec t  of employment), and 
by the  socie ty  (through t h e  generation o r  l i be ra t i on  of foreign exchange), 8 
considerable share  of t h e  s o c i a l  benef i ts  generated by i n d u s t r i a l  investments 
goes t o  the  investors  of cap i t a l .  For evaluation i n  t h i s  respect ,  see:  m E ,  
Perry, Guillermo, e t  81.: maluaci6n Social  de 30 Proyectos Industr ia les  de 
Colombia, 1974. " 
1 0 / I t  should be noted t h a t  it i s  not enough t o  obtain a nat ional  p a r t i c i ~ c t i o n  of - 
51: i n  t he  t o t a l  stock of t h e  Company t o  ensure an eqc i tab le  d i s t r i bu t ion  of 
benefits .  It is a l so  e s sen t i a l  t o  achieve a minimum "control" of t h e  Ccipen~r, 
i n  order t o  avoid t h a t  t ransnat ional  corporations, f o r  exmple ,  through the  
inter-company d i s t r i bu t ion  of earnings of an in te rna t iona l  s ca l e ,  m y  obtain 
"hidden" p r o f i t s  (which do not adequately r e f l e c t  t h e  re turns  generated) i n  
t he  operation through a "branch" i n  a given country, t h a t  cannot be effect ively  
eppropriated by t h e  l oca l  shzreholders or  t he  country who receives t h e  icvest- 
~ e n t  (as i n  thk case of over-invoicing end under-invoicing of pr ices  i n  in te r -  
conpmy t ransac t ions ,  f o r  example). 
f .  F ina l ly ,  t h a t  an increas ing sdjustment of economic p o l i c i e s  be seeked, 
i n  such a way t h a t  t h e  process "would not depend only on t h e  indiscr iminated 
,I g-/ a c t i o n  of  t h e  market fo rces  . 
THE A G R E W T  IhrSTRUMENTS AM) TKEIR RELATION TO THE STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT 
In accordance wi th  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  given by t h e  Boerd on t h e  i m p l i c i t  ' 
s t r a t e m  i n  t h e  Carbagena Agreement, t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  process would be  developed 
through t h e  fol lowing s t ages  o r  phases: "F i r s t  R e s e :  '~e ter r r insz t ion of t h e  
f i e l d  ~f h7ha.t s,e.y b e  $ r @ g r m e d  ari& k.:=ei; is sub jec t  tc Ii-fieretlcn, as w e l l  LS 
t h e  p o l i c i e s  regarding t h i r d  countr ies .  . . Second Phase : 'Preoaration and ap- 
p rova l  of t h e  P S D I ' & ~ ~ ~  p a r t i a l  carrying out of t h e s e ,  while t h e  l a r g e s t  
countr ies  i n i t i a t e  and advance t h e  t a x  r e l e a s e  process,  and adppt an A E M ~ C .  
Third Phase: Carrying out  of a l l  programs, progress of  l i b e r e t i o n  up t o  t h e  
t o t a l  opening o f  t h e  market, adoption of  t h e  PBC and adjustment of a l l  t h e  neces- 
sa ry  p o l i c i e s  t o  preserve  condit ions of  competition ... Fourth Phase: A g r e a t e r  
progres's i n  t h e  coordinat ion of t h e  g rea t  comon eccnomic p o l i c i e s  and cul-mineticn 
1, of  t h e  const ruct ion o f  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  economic union . 
Therefore, as  t h e  establishment o f  a long term economic union w a s  seeked, it was 
pretended t o  reach something &ore than a custom unio&/in t h e  medium term, s ince  
t h e  approval and implementation of  a l l  t h e  s e c t o r i a l  programs of i n d u s t r i a l  dev- 
elopment i n  an approximate per iod of 5 years  f o r  t h e  l a r g e s t  countr ies  wes a l s o  
contemplated. 
Consequently, emphasis of t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n i s t  process i n  t h e  medim term 
was given t o :  
g / ~ o a r d  of Cartagena Agreement, Ib id .  , 1972, p.  7. 
12/PSDI = S e c t o r i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Development 'Programs. - 
= Minimum Comon Foreign T a r i f f .  
1 3 / ~ o a r d  of Cartagena Agreement, Ib id .  , 1976, pp. 15-16. - 
1 4 / ~ a l - a s s a ,  Bela, "Hacia una Teorfa de l a  Integraci6n ~ c o n B ~ c a " ,  i n  Wionczek, - 
M.S . (ed. ) , "Iiitegraci6n de Amgrica Latina:  Experiencf zs  y Ferspectivas , I f  
Fondo Cultura Econ6mica, Mgxico, 1964, p. 7. 
a .  The c r ea t i on  of a customs union t h a t  would es tab l i sh  t h e  extended and 
151 protected market, dememded by t h e  strategy.- 
< 
161 b. The r a t i o n a l i z a t i o ~  and financing of investments i n  t h e  new basic 
indus t r i es ,  axis  of t h e  s t ra tegy .  
c. The adoption of a common treatment t o  fore ign c a p i t a l  and t o  t h e  trans- 
f e r  of technology. 
c. !he s a t i s f e c t o q  d i s t r i bu t i on  of t h e  beriefits of t h e  in tegra t ion  pro- 
cess mong t h e  Member Ccv i t r i e s  . 
Which of t h e  i o s t r m e n t s  foreseen i n  t h e  agreement had more s ignif icance,  
can be deduced by t h e  decisive t ine- tables  defined fo r  t h e i r  adoption: t he  
Program of Liberation of t h e  Subregional c o n m e r c ~ !  t h e  AEC$[ t he  adjustment 
of l eg i s l a t i ons  on i n d u s t r i a l  developmene(  t h e  adjustment of regula t ing ins t ru-  
ments and mechanisms of foreign trade=( the  PSDI ' s g :  t h e  unjform treatment t o  
mult inational  en t e rp r i s e s  of t h e  ~ u b r e ~ i o n q  and t h e  common t reatmenk t o  foreigx 
cap i t a l s  and t o  trademarks, patents  , l i censes  and royal t ies% as  follows : 
a. The crea t ion  of a  customs union i n  t h e  medium term was foreseen through 
t h e  adoption of automatic programs of t a x  re lease  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a l  t r ade  i n  t he  
- 15/ The enlarged market would a l so  be obtained through t h e  appl icat ion of sound 
po l ic ies  on income r ed i s t r i bu t i on  ins ide  each country. 
Rat ional izat ion implies,  among other  th ings ,  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of s ca l e  eco- 
nomies and t h e  most adequate l cca l iza t ion ,  considering t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of rew 
m i t e r i a s  and consumption cen te rs ,  as  well  a s  t ranspor t  costs .  It should be 
p ~ i n t e d  out t h a t  t h e  term ra t iona l iza t ion  used i n  t h i s  essay,  does not agree 
with i t s  meaning i n  the  so-called "programs of i n d u s t r i a l  rationali.zation" 
i n  t h e  Agreement. 
171 A r t .  45 of t h e  Agreement. -
181 A r t .  62, TDid. -
l g /  A r t .  28, Ib id .  -
201 A r t .  30, Ib id .  -
21/ A r t .  47, Ib id ,  -
221 Art. 28, Ibid.  -
23/ A r t .  27, Ib id .  -
subregion, t h e  adoption of an AEG (with t h e  adoption of a  Common Ydnimum Ex- 
t e r n a l  Custom T a r i f f ,  a s  a  previous s t e p )  and t h e  adjustment of " l e g i s l z t i o n  
02 fore ign t rade"  o f  t h e  countries.  
i 
b. The r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of  investments i n  t h e  new bas ic  indus t r i e s  was 
foreseen through t h e  adoption of  t h e  PSDI1s; *its f inancing through t h e  crea t ion 
of  t h e  CAF and through t h e  cons t i tu t ion  of mul t ina t iona l  Andean e n t e ~ r i s e s  i n  
t h e  Subregion. It is  worth point ing out t h a t  t h e  adoption of such a novel 
mechanism a s  t h e  PSDI'S+ seemed f e a s i b l e  a t  t h a t  moment due t o  t h e  pz r t i c ipa -  
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s t r a t e m  assigned t o  t h e  governments and t o  f o r e i @  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  
develc.pn-ent of EXC?: s e c t c r s .  Actuelly , t5e gcverrment cr!d t h e  "Lrersr,z;lc::tl 
companies a r e  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  p lan  and program t h e i r  investments ~t e xced.iup 
tern;. However, t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  governients t o  have t h e  s t a t e  p r o g r m  and 
p a r t i c i p a t e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  development depends on t h e  ideological  
conception and on t h e  economic po l i cy  adopted by them. 
c.  The adoption of a  common treatment t o  fore ign c a p i t a l  and t o  t h e  t r ans -  
f e r  of technology was foreseen a t  f i x e d  term i n  t h e  Agreement, as  was pointed out .  
d. F ina l ly ,  t h e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  b e n e f i t s  of t h e  process 
as foreseen by providing p r e f e r e n t i a l  t reatments t o  Ecuador and Bol iv ia  i n  t h e  
app l i ca t ion  of each of t h e  mentioned instruments,  but i n  p a r t i c u l ~ r  through the  
PSDI sw. 
24/ The only background i s  represented by t h e  Agreements of  I n d u s t r i d  Special iza-  -
t i o n  i n  t h e  CAIilE (council  of Mutual Economic Assistance,  organizet ion f o r  t h e  
economic i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h e  USSR, East Germeny, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun- 
gary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and ~ u b a ) .  I n  t h e s e  coun t r i e s ,  t h e  exis- 
tence of c e n t r a l  planning regimes and s i m i l a r  p o l i t i c a l  and development ob- 
j ec t ives  make t h e  process eas ie r .  I n  s p i t e  of  t h e  above, t h e  agreements do 
not  have t h e  degree of coverage, automation and compulsory character  ES t h e  
PSDI, and opera te  b a s i c a l l y  through t h e  voluntary coordination of develo~ment 
and fore ign t r a d e  programs. See, f o r  example, Pryor, F.,  " E l  Sistema Conunis- 
t a  de Comercio Exterior". 
25/ For an exce l l en t  discussion on why t h e  PSDI should represent  t h e  bes t  -
poss ib le  mechanism of b e n e f i t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n i s t  process i n  
t h e  subregion, see Salgado, Germgnico, I b i d . ,  pp. 89-111. 
Apart from s e t t i n g  up p r e f e r e n t i a l  t reatments concerning t h e  aajustrnent of 
economic p o l i c i e s  and t h e  PSDI, t h e  Member Countries obliged t o  act j o i n t l y  
before any e n t i t y  t o  obta in  t e c h n i c a l  e s s i s t ance  and f inanc ia t ion  f o r  t h e  
p r i o r i t y  in ' s t a l l a t ion  of i n d u s t r i a l  p len t s  o r  complexes f n  Bcl iv ia  and 
Ecuador (see  Chapter XTII of t h e  Cartagena ~ ~ r e e m e n t ) .  
Consequently, t h e  Agreement an t i c ipa ted  other complementary instmments t o  
t he  above (programming of t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and t ranspor ta t ion  sec to rs ;  etljust- 
men1 of exchange, f i s c a l  end monetary po l i c i e s ;  " i ndus t r i a l  r a t iona l ize t ion" ,  
e tc .  ) but ne i the r  d i d  it e s t ab l i sh  terms f o r  t h e i r  development, nor t h e  Ccz- 
mission nor t h e  Board were a s  determined a s  they had been regarding t hc se  ~ 1 -  
readys/. These c l e a r l y  had a  more d i r ec t  r e l a t i o n  with t h e  implecentation 05 
t he  main aspects  of t h e  bas ic  conmon development s t r a t egy ,  as  it i s  c l e a r  frcz 
the  proceding paragraphs. 
I n  addi t ion,  it I s  ~ r o r t h  ~ c i n t . i n g  ou t ,  t,l?~~t t h e r e  was s u c k  f ~ i t h  fz t5f~ 
common s t r a t egy  ana i n  t h e  r o l e  t h a t  governnents would have i n  i t s  develogze:-z, 
t h a t  t h e  Agreement an t i c ipa ted  t o  reach not only t h e  adjustment of t h e  eccrio=tc 
po l i c i e s ,  but  a l s o  t h e  coordination of t h e  development plans and finel-21- e. 
27/ system of jo in t  planning f o r  t h e  subregion- . 
In  f a c t ,  a s  it was already mentioned, t h e  c rea t ion  of a  cus tm m i o n  12th 
jo in t  programming o f  c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i a l  sec to rs  was conceived a s  a _~re%<ous s t e  
fo r  t h e  creat ion of an economic union i n  t h e  long term. 
CWGES IN THE, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CARTAGENA AGREESIENT* 
- 
1. The Andean Group within t h e  Process of Latin American Integrzt ion 
The Agreement wzs born from t h e  de s i r e  t o  form a  common block agains t  the 
determinant inf luence of Argentina, Braz i l  and Mexico i n  t h e  in tegra t ion  grocess , 
This s i t ua t i on  changed a s  time went by, a t  l e a s t  i n  two countries.  In the  fir=% 
place,  upon t h e  t ak ing  over of General Banzer i n  Bol iv ia ,  i n  1371, a -hum process 
261 Regarding t h e  programs of i n d u s t r i a l  r a t i ona l i z a t i on ,  it n ~ s t  be zch-c%-ledge5 -
t h a t  t h e i r  execution vas neglected during t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  yes r s  due t o  t h e  
p r i o r i t y  granted t o  handling of o ther  mechanisms.. ." ( ~ o a r d  C~rtzgel la  e e c c r t ,  
1976, p. 126).  This paragraph r e f e r s  t o  t h e  "ra t  ionsl iza t ion"  prcgrezs 
foreseen i n  t h e  Agreenent, which, a s  alreedy ind ica ted ,  do not correspord t o  
t h e  term r a t i ona l i z a t i on  used i n  t h i s  essay. 
27/ Ar t i c l e  26 of t h e  agreement. -
* From here on excerpts  of t h e  t r a n s l a t e d  a r t i c l e  from "~oyuntura  Eccn6rrLcs" 
a r e  quoted and in terspersed with M O r s  PSU summary based on c i teE 5ibl icgrz ; i r  
of p o l i t i c a l  approach and of economic cooperation with Braz i l  was s ta r ted .  Bo- 
l i v i a  was offered capital. end technolow by the  countries of  the  southern cone 
b -- par t icu la r ly  Braz i l  -- and, on t h e  other hand, t h e  Andean group offered it 
k markets. This s i t u a t i o n  explains t h e  frequent t h rea t s  of Bolivia t o  withdraw 
from the Andean group i f  ce r t a in  dems~lds were not s a t i s f i e d .  This const i tutes  
a pressing element t h a t  mekes t h e  process of negotiation among countries dif -  
f i c u l t  t o  a  great  ex ten t .  SecondTy, t he  present government of Chile does not 
have a  c l ea r  i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  subregional integrat ion process and ra ther  seeks 
L gol i t iczl .  ~ r d .  com;ercial a.;p?-oech t o  the gcverm~ents of krger!.bina 2cd. Ercz+il. 
This new Latin Aneric&n, geopol i t ical  r e a l i t y  has had repercussions on the  pres- 
ent f e a s i b i l i t y  of t he  Andean group. 
2. Changes i n  t h e  Development Strategy of the  Member Countries 
Since the  Cartagena Agreement has as i ts  f i n a l  goal t o  accelerate  t h e  eco- 
nomic and soc i a l  development of t he  Member Countries, i t  intends t o  reach t h i s  
objective by giving more emphasis t o  indus t r ia l iza t ion ,  through a  pro tec t ion is t  
model based on subs t i t u t ion  of imports. 
Two subregional countries ( ~olombi  a and ch i l e )  changed t h e i r  development 
s t ra tegy giving up t h e  emphasis on the  i ndus t r i a l  sec tor  by protecting an i n -  
2P/ dus t r i a l  development based on the  t r a d i t i o n a l  in te rna t iona l  division of labor-- 
and not on a pro tec t ion is t  process of subs t i tu t ion  of imports. 
Consequently, t h e  governments of these two countries are t ry ing  t o  reduce 
economic costs associated with protectionism, demanding an average l e v e l  for  
AEC in fe r io r  t o  t h a t  proposed by t h e  governments of t h e  other Member Countries. 
This difference i n  l eve l s  i s  par t icu la r ly  s ign i f ican t  i n  t he  case of Chile. Like- 
wise, they a re  unconcerned regarding the  PSDI's s ince,  ne i ther ,  t h e i r  new s t r a t -  
egy gives preference t o  programmed indusJiries, cor t h e i r  economic policy i s  con- 
s i s t e n t  with the  use of t h i s  i n s t r m e n t .  Actually, t h e i r  policy of non par t ic i -  
pation on the  par t  of t h e  government i n  t h e  i ndus t r i a l  sec tor  leads t o  the inef- 
L ficacy of i ndus t r i a l  programming inside t h e i r  econoltlies and, consequently, r a i s e s  
a  confl ic t  with t h e  use of  t h e  instrwnent a t  subregional l eve l .  
. .  . . .  . . , .  . . . . . .  . \_ -. . .  . . , . >, 
I .: . 
281 Internat ional  divis ion of labor proposed by t h e  c l a s s i c  thecry cf coniparative - 
advantages, which r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  d.evj~.t.ion f r o m  t.he ~ m n h n . ~ i  s n i ~ r e n  h?r  t h e  
agreement on bas i c  industr ies ,  
A t  the  other extreme a r e  Peru and Venezuela, whose present s t r a t eg i e s  co- 
incide essen t ia l ly ,  although f o r  d i f fe ren t  reasons, with t h a t  serving as 8 b s e  
L 
t o  t h e  Agreement's conception: "supporters1' of t he  PSDI1s and of a re la t ive* 
"high" AEC. Thus, Venezuela, given i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of' subs tan t ia l  f i n e n c i e  
resources,  pa r t i cu l a r ly  i n  the  hands of t he  government, and the  condit icn cf 
a r e l a t i v e l y  i nc ip i en t  i n t e rna l  i n d u s t r i a l  development, f inds i n  t h e  Andeen 
Group t h e  "great" p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  become "industrial ized",  with spec ia l  par t i c i -  
pation from the government i n  the  development of basic  indus t r ies ,  through t h e  
u t i l i z a t i o n  of an extended market i n  a protected si tuat , ion offered by t h e  &GEE- 
aent .  Likewise, Peru, i n  its i n t e r n a l  development s t ra tegy ,  considers Ee EL 
unavoidable requirement the  development of t he  indus t r ies  known a5 "besic E'G 
s t ra teg ic" ,  i n  order  t o  reduce i t s  condition of "dependent" corntry. 
On t he  other hand, Bolivia and Ecuador, because of  the  s t ruc tu re  of pro- 
duction of t h e i r  eccnomies, a r e  convinced tha t  t h e  most important benef i t s  ttet 
can be obtained from in tegra t ion  a r e  those derived from the loca t ion  of "dyl;&cn 
indus t r ies  i n  t h e i r  countr ies ,  i n  s p i t e  of the  "costs" t h a t  these  may imply. 
l e a s t  t h i s  would p ro t ec t  them i n  t h e  me d i m  term. For t h i s  resson, they hare 
been c loser  t o  Peru and Venezuela, although, due t o  t h e  charac te r i s t i cs  of t ' r e i r  
ex te rna l  sector  (highly specia l ized i n  exports of some primary goods and d e ~ m d e ~ t  
on imports of most o f  t h e  other goods), they heve seeked,part icularly Eolivlle, 
intermediate l eve ls  f o r  t h e  AEC, and so  avoid incurr ing i n  subs tan t ia l  "cos=" 
increases f o r  t h e i r  economies. 
I n  t h i s  way, a con f l i c t  was created between, on one hand, t h e  countries 
t h a t  give a greater  emphasis t o  t he  r o l e  of t h e  market forces ,  both in i n t ~ r - , c l  
and subregional p o l i c i e s  a d  on t h e  o ther ,  those t h a t  defend a greater  ~ e r t l c i -  
pation of subregionel. and governmental planning and p r o g r d n g .  
Because of t he  s t rong Colombian and Chi lem pos i t ion ,  t h e  other four corn- 
t r i e s  refused t o  reach an agreement on t h e  AEC u n t i l  t h e  PSDI1s agreemnt 
progressed.291 Although t h e  AEC would not  be f u l l y  o p e r a t i v s !  f o r  t h e  above 
reasons, they were concerned about t h e  delay i n  approving t h e  PSDIts s i nce  t h e  
L 
approval of a genera l  "low" l e v e l  of  t h e  AEC would probably l e a d  t o  r e l a t i v e l y  
"low" leve l s  of t h e  AEC f o r  t h e  PSDIts. They. t r i e d ,  then,  t o  force  Chile and 
Colonibia t o  approve t h e  PSDIts, subject  t o  t h e  approval of AEC, which is c r u c i a l  
t o  t h e  i n t e rna l  economic pol icy  of t h e  two countries.  Thus, i n  general  terms, 
t h i s  i s  how the  genera l  non-fulfillment of t h e  time-tables es tab l i shed  i n  t h e  
Agreement was generated.  
These chenges i n  t h e  development si;rate(;y have been ticcompaliied, fur ther-  
more, by t he  p o s i t i o n  of Chile regarding t h e  treatment t o  fore ign cap i t e l .  Chi- 
l e  expressed i ts  dec i s ion  to  solve  i n  p a r t  t h e  problems of i n t e r n a l  savings by 
means of  t h e  non-nationalizing of i t s  indust ry ,  i n  f l ag r an t  contradic t ion t o  
Decision 24. The open v io l a t i on  of t h i s  Decision through Decree Law 600 of 
July 13,  1974, has tened t h e  c r i s i s  of t h e  Andean Group. Right a f t e r  t h i s  decree 
a per iod of nego t ia t ions  began, i n  which Chile requested t h e  modification of Deci- 
3 Y  s ion  24. One of t h e  points  mentioned was t h e t  r e l a t i n g  t o  p r o f i t  remittance.- 
3. Solving t h e  C r i s i s ?  
- 
On April  10 ,  1976, t he  countries of  t h e  Andean group gave i n  t o  t h e  Chilesn 
pos i t i on ,  by means of Decision 97, which authorizes t h e  s a l e  t o  fore ign investors  
o f  t h e  shares,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n s  o r  r i g h t s  belonging wholly o r  p a r t i a l l y  t o  t h e  
31 The above count r i es  even demanded t o  carry  out t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  of t h e  in t ra -  -
subregional t r a d e ,  i n  accordance with t h e  schedule of  t h e  PSDI. Thus, Deci- 
s i on  100 fo resees  an extension of  t h e  t e r m  fo r  t h e  LiSeration Progrm.  
301 I n  case it were, some countries l i k e  Venezuela would hardly  f i nd  acceptcible, -
i n  t h e  absence of amendments i n  t h e i r  exchange pol icy ,  a very "low" AEC. I n  
f e c t ,  i t s  high p ro tec t ion  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s ec to r ,  s i q l y  compensztes i n  
p a r t  fo r  the  ex i s t ence  of  a r a t e  of exchange determined by t h e  predcninence 
of  o i l  revenues i n  i t s  "superavit" t r a d e  balance. 
311 During t h e  f i f t e e n t h  period of sess icns  of t h e  comdssion of Cartagena Agree- -
merit, t h e  Chilean Ambassador, Alejandro Sara,  explained t h e  pos i t i on  of h i s  
government i n  t h e  following t e r m :  " ~ e c i s i o n  24 o f fe r s  negative aspects  t o  
a t t r a c t  fore ign c a p i t a l  which only es tab l i shes  a 14% regarding t h e  remittence 
of p r o f i t s  t o  t h e  foreign inves to r ,  while t h e  European banks, with no r i s k  
whatsoever, a r e  pz,ying i n t e r e s t  of 1 5 %  of f ixed  t e r n  deposits". 
Corporation for Production Development (CORFO) . This Decision represects E 
regsessive s t ep  i n  t h e  in tegra t ion is t  process, s ince it est&blishes  s ~ r e c e s e n t  ,
t o  prompt i n  the  fu ture  s imi la r  s i tua t ions  cf exception. Furthemcre,  e s p e c i d  
commission was created i n  t h i s  meeting t o  study the  amenc?ments t o  Decision 24. 
On June 10, 1976 t h e  commissionfs working group of t h e  C U C t e g e n ~  ~ e ~ 2 t  
reeched a consensus t o  amend Decision 24. The main points  t o  be a e o & d  were 
t he  following : 
a. Elimination of t he  1 4 %  l imi ta t ion  t o  p r o f i t  remittance cf f c r e i g i  
comprtnies, leaving every country f r e e  t o  es tab l i sh  t h e  rrost conver-iezlt l 5 t s  
eccording t o  the  i n t e r e s t s  of each country. 
b. Treat t h e  s a r e g i o n a l  cap i t a l  of nat ional  investors  es  rationd.. 
These recommendatioi~s should be r a t i f i e d  by the  governments of the s i x  b!cber 
Countries, and througfi them it was pretended t o  reach a c o n c i l i ~ t i c n  w i t h  the  
Chilean Government. 
Decision 100 w a s  another attempt t o  solve t he  c r i s i s .  It estzbl iskes  
amendments t o  t he  &agena Agreement: 
a. To extend two more years  the  time-tables foreseen fo r  t b e  LiSeration 
Program, f o r  the  reserve period, f o r  t h e  approvd of AEC and f o r  t h e  first e ~ -  
proximation t o  t he  agreed AEC; 
b. To e s t ab l i sh  a customs ta r i f f  "bracket" where leve ls  of r e h  m d  
minimum protection a r e  contemplated i n  favor of subregiond prodccts; 
c. To exclude a l i s t  of products from the  o r ig ina l  reserve f i s t  rzld a s s i w  
them fo r  i ndus t r i a l  programming; 
d. The p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a s e c t o r i a l  program can be approved ty olily t w c  
t h i rd s  of t h e  Member Countries and put i n t o  operation by them; 
e. The def in i t ion  of t h e  procedure for t he  incorporation of the %Taker 
Countries t h a t  do not pa r t i c ipa t e  i n i t i a l l y  i n  t h e  s e c t o r i e l  prop-. 
I n  addi t ion,  as provided fo r  i n  Ar t i c l e  6,"the non-participating countries 
( i n  t he  PsDI's) s h a l l  incorporate t h e  products of t h e  "par t i c ipe t ing  countries" 
C. 
i n  t h e i r  respect ive  l i s t s  of exceptions, i n  t he  cases where they were not in- 
cluded. The Conmission, upon proposal  from t h e  Board, s h a l l  determine t h e  terms 
and condit ions f o r  l i b e r a t i n g  and adopting t he  Common Foreign Ta r i f f  of these  
321 products . , . 'I-
The main cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of a ec i s i on  100 heve been described; given t h e  
nature  of  t h e  commitments t h a t  r esu l t ed  from t h e  "apparent conci l ia t ion"  of 
econox ic  pol ic ies  df fferest fn t e res t s ,  (pz+ ' t lculer iy  e x o : : ~  LL!;c +,i.:s grcs;l: 
of countr ies  mentioned above), it is  advisable t o  analyze t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of 
t h e  process r e s u l t i n g  from it and t h e  operative character  and e f f e c t i v i t y  of  
t h e  proposed mechanism. 
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  c r ea t i on  of a custom t a r i f f  "bracket" would allow Colombia 
and Chile t o  p lace  themselves i n  l eve l s  of a r e l a t i v e l y  "lower1' customs t a r i f f  
p ro tec t ion  than what would have r e su l t ed  from t h e  approval of  an S C  f o r  t h e  
subregion. In t u r n ,  Colombia and Chile,  (being ab le  t o  abs ta in  from par t i c ipa t -  
ing  i n  t h e  PSDIts) ,  "would allow" t o  pursue t h e  g rea t  i n t e r e s t  of t he  
o ther  four  countr ies  i n  t h e  app l ica t ion  of t h i s  instrument as  a bas ic  elelcent 
i n  t h e  in tegre t ion  process. Consequently, i n  p r inc ip le ,  t he se  foc r  cour-tries 
would h'ave p re fe r red  t h e  PSDI1s i n  t h e  framework of a " joint"  market, while 
Chile and Colombia would heve p r e f e r r ed  a "lm" AEC f o r  t h e  subregion. 
Consequently, i n  t h e  shor t  term, t h e  d i f f e r i ng  pos i t ions  of t h e  corn t r i es  
a r e  apparently s a t i s f i e d .  The es tab l i sh ing  of a "low" i n f e r i o r  l i m i t  of t h e  
AEC "bracket" and t h e  now compulsory na tu re  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  PSDI's would 
allow t h e  productive resources t o  p lace  themselves i n  those  productive a c t i v i t i e s  
which have a comparative advantage i n  terms of t h e  world merket. The above tiould 
be i n  accordance w i th  t h e  bas ic  purposes of  t h e  economic po l i c i e s  of t h e  present  
governments of Colombia and Chile. 
3A/ Decision 100, A r t i c l e  6 ,  item b. 
On the  o ther  hand, t h e  development of t h e  PSDIts i n  t h e  o ther  four  coun- 
trits would imply t h a t  t h e  development of  these  countr ies  would not depend only 
on t h e  forces operat ing i n  t h e  world market. But t h i s  would have t o  be c o q l e -  
mented simultaneously with p r i c e  mechanisms, such as tar iffs ,  t h a t  would insure 
t h e  benef i t s  f o r  t h e  country t h a t  each program seeks. 
Therefore, t h e  adoption of a r e l a t i v e l y  "high" AEC and t he  pa r t i c i pa t i on  i n  
t h e  PSDI's correspond t o  t h e  bas ic  object ives  o f  t h e  economic p o l i t y  of s a i d  
governments. 
Notwithstanding t h i s  "apparent" f e a s i b i l i t y  of t h e  agreed co~mitments it 
i s  undoubtful t h a t  some con f l i c t s  and contradic t ions  would occur i n  t h e  medium 
term, ins ide  t h e  Group. I n  t h e  first place ,  t h e  increase  of intra-subregionel  
t r a d e  could l ead  t o  an important concentration of commercial balances,  i n  t h i s  
case i n  "favor1' o f  t h e  countries placed i n  t h e  i n f e r i o r  p a r t  of  t h e  customs 
t a r i f f  These countries would o f f e r  a scant  advantage t o  t h e  -art 
of gocds coming from the  Subregion and, i n  t u rn ,  would p r o f i t  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e i r  exports t o  t h e  Andean market would be favored i n  general  by t he  high pro- 
t e c t i o n  given by t h e  other  Member Countries. Not l e s s  important, t h e  increase  
i n  t h e  "displaced t;adel' i n  t h e  Subregion would be encouraged, t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
- inpor t s  coming from t h i r d  countries through t h e  Member countries with a low 
A E C ~  would be  increased,  thus c rea t ing  a permanent tens ion of t h e  mechanisms 
of c e r t i f i c a t i o n  and control  of o r i g in ,  and an apparent need t o  implant o ther  
obstacles  t o  intre-subregional  t r ade .  Therefore, it i s  important t o  foresee 
t h e  reac t ion  of t h e  countr ies  placed i n  t h e  higher p a r t  of  t h e  "bracket" t o  t h e  
eventual occurrence of such f a c t s .  
Regarding t h e  ' 'part ial1 '  programming ( t h a t  i s ,  among four  o r  f i v e  c o m t r i e s )  
it i s  advisable t o  analyze t he  reasons why a c o n t r y  would abs ta in  from ps r t i c -  
i pa t i ng  i n  a given program and t h e  consequences derived thereof .  On t he  one 
p e r t ,  from t h e  above discussions,  t he  p robab i l i ty  t h a t  Colombia and/or Chile 
abs ta in  from p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  a program (or  i n  some programs) f o r  considering 
s/ Shhiata ,  H. , "A Theory of Free Trade Areas", i n  Robson, P. (ed. ) Interna- 
t i o n a l  I n t eg ra t i cn ,  Penguin ~ o o k s ,  1972, pp. 68-87. 
34/ The importance of t h a t  concentration would na tu r a l l y  depend on t h e  extensicn -
of t h e  "bracket'' i n  r e l a t i on  t o  t h e  t r en spo r t  cos t s  i n  t h e  subregion. 
t h e  AEC proposed i n  such program or  program very "high", i s  evident. I n  ec- 
cordance with A r t i c l e  6 of Decision 100, t h e  Commission would agree on t h e  tcrs 
L 
and conditions f o r  t h e  adoption of t h e  AEC by t h e  non-part icipating countries;  
a s  well a s  f o r  t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  of t h e i r  marketq t o  t h e  products which a r e  inclxde2 
i n  a program (o r  t h e  programs) o r ig ina t ing  i n  t h e  o ther  Member Countries. Crce 
t h e  moment of t h i s  'new negotiat ions a r r i ve s ,  t h e  non-participating countries 
probably would i n s i s t ,  even more than before ,  on reducing t h e  AEC, s ince  they  
would probebly not have enjoyed t h e  advantages of having exclcsive a l locat iozs .  
Eveztually t h e  other  countr ies  wodd be w i l l i ng  t o  negot ia te  i n  order t o  kiexre 
Eccess t o  these  muirets  oi' t h e  non -pa r t i c ip~ i ing  c o m t r i e s ,  but they could ? W E  
a ser ious  problem. A s  a matter of f a c t ,  t o  t h e  extent  t h a t  t h e  market of tFe  
non-participating countries cons t i tu tes  an important f r ac t i on  of t h e  Andean 
market, t h e  pa r t i c ipan t s  would have been compelled t o  carry  out t h e  prog=& 
- * " ineff ic ient ly"  and under a protect ion l e v e l  regarded a s  narrow by them, es ~t 
30 I would have been designed i n i t i a l l y  f o r  t h e  j o in t  market.- Under these  cozle t iczs ,  
it would be probable t h a t  t h e  programmed indus t r i es  would not be i n  a pos i t i cn  t c  
put  up with t h e  i n t e rna t i ona l  competition with l eve l s  lower than the  AEC. 1s e e i i  
of t h e  above, t h e  scan t  p o s s i b i l i t y  of success of these  subsequent negot ia t i css  
m y  be anticipated.  
- 
On t h e  other  p a r t ,  a country may absta in  from pa r t i c ipa t i ng  fo r  not beizg 
i n  agreement with t h e  proposed a l loca t ion  i n  order t o  avoid, f o r  example, t o  
i n j u r e  "national" economic i n t e r e s t s  even though t h e  l e v e l  of protect ion sug- 
gested i n  t h e  program may be considered acceptable. In  t h i s  case,  and a g e n  
under t h e  assumption t h a t  t he r e  a r e  s ca l e  economies, it would probebly nain- 
t a i n  or develop branches of t h e  respect ive  infiustry based barely  on i t s  proper 
market and there fore ,  with r e l a t i v e  "high" costs  . Should it accept subs eo_ueri;Ly 
t h e  AEC agreed on by t h e  others and l i b e r a t e  i t s  market, it would put its it.- 
dustry i n  a posi t ion t o  face  a poss ible  "dangerous" competition i n  f ron t  cf'lts 
I f ,  a s  it may be hssumed, t he r e  a r e  important s ca l e  economies i n  t h e  a e n t i c ~ e C  
indus t r i es .  
- 361 O r  e l s e ,  e l t e rna t i ve ly  , they would have been unable t o  carry  it out,  o r  r-cdd 
have increased t h e  AEC even fu r the r  upon reviewing t h e  program two years l e t e r ,  
when the  term <or t h e  possible adherence of non-participents would have eq i re6 .  
par tners ,  who would have progranrmed based on a more q l e  market, as i n  f ron t  
of t Q i r d  pa r t i e s .  Again i n  t h i s  case t h e  r e l a t i v e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of su3sequent 
negotiet ions i s  evident .  . 
Consequently, mechanisms proposed i n  Decision 100, only seem f ea s ib l e  a t  
medium t e r m  i n  cases  i n  which, simultaneously, t he r e  a r e  no se r ious  disagree- 
ments i n  the  i n i t i a l l y  proposed l e v e l  f o r  t h e  respect ive  AEC, and where no 
ilrportant s ca l e  economies e x i s t  i n  t h e  programmed indus t r i e s .  Eut i n  these  
ccses, f n ~ C z m e ~ t a l  Ccubts regsrding t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of pro&remGng, i n  acccr- 
dmce with Ar t i c le  32 of t h e  Agreement, would h r i s e .  
Therefore, i n  our opinion, t h e  system propssed by Decision 100 a s  t o  t h e  
PSDI 's would be condemned t o  f a i l u r e .  It would be Icore f e a s i b l e ,  although 
i n i t i a l l y  it i s  more d i f f i c u l t  under t h e  present  c i rcuns tmces  2escribed abcve, 
t o  a r r i v e  at comon agreements of t h e  s i x  Member Countries i n  connection with 
t h e  adv isab i l i ty  t o  program, with t h e  a l loca t ions  and t h e  AEC s t r uc tu r e  i n  each 
s e c t o r i a l  program. 
Immediately w e  w i l l  explore i n t o  t h e  type of i n t e g r ~ t i o n  t h a t  would r e s u l t  
from the approval o? t h e  add i t iona l  protocol  recomnended by Decision 100. Fron 
t h e  above paragraphs, it i s  c l e a r  t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y ,  an authent ic  f r e e  t r a d e  zone 
would not  be c r ea t ed  even i n  t h e  medium t e r n .  TJot only t h e r e  would be merkets 
mutually protected mong pa r t i c i pa t i ng  and non-part icipating countr ies  i n  t he  
PSDIts during t h e  l i f e  o f  s a i d  programs, but  a l so  from t h e  zbove, it would be 
probable t h a t  t h e  subsequent ar,t.icipated l i b e r a t i o n  would be  se r ious ly  hindered. 
Likewise, a t r u e  customs union could not  be resched s ince  i~ ~ d d i t i o n  t o  t he  
afore  mentioned reesons ,  the  common adoption of a comon PXC s t r i ic ture  f o r  t h e  
Subregion would be abandoned, a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  time being; t h a t  i s ,  a comcn 
posi t ion of t h e  melrber countries facing t h e  t r ade  of goods coning from t h i r d  
countries would not be adopted. Obviously, under these  ccn i i t i ons ,  t he  pcs- 
s i b i l i t y  of forming an economic union i n  t h e  subregion and of  a r r i v ing  &t e 
system of jo in t  p l an i f i c a t i on  as foreseen i n  Ar t i c l e  26 of t h e  Agreenea"is 
even Eore remote. Consequently, the  Andean subregional i n t e g r r t i o n  scheme vcu ld  
chmige i n  t he  mediuz term i n t o  a s t range "hsbrid". 
I 
On the  one hand, t he re  would be important segments of t h e  non-liberated 
market among groups of countries,  and on the  other ,  t h e  p a r t i a l  zone of emergent 
f r ee  t r ade  would show a ce r t a in  degree of "customs coordination" (depending on 
t h e  extent  of t he  ex te rna l  customs "bracket" agreed on) ,  but would not cons t i tu te  
properly a customs d o n ,  This would represent a ser ious  back move i n  t he  prog- 
ress t h a t  t h e  Andean ~ r o $  showed over t h e  LAFTA, 
However, Chile refused t o  subscribe t h e  addi t iona l  protocol t o  the  Carta- 
gene. Agreement recommended by Decision 100 while t he  other cou2tries d i d  sus- 
cr ibe  it. On October 30 of t h e  present year ,  Decision 102 came i n t o  e f f e c t ,  by 
means of which t h e  r i g h t s  and obligations derived from t h e  Cartagena Agreement 
cease f o r  Chile. Thus, t h e  f i n a l  withdrawal of t h i s  country from the  Andean Sub- 
regional Pact i s  l ega l ized ,  maintaining obligations and r i gh t s  only on four  
decisions,  es f o l l m s :  Decision 40 ( ~ ~ r e e m e n t  t o  avoid double t axa t ion ) ,  Deci- 
sion 46 (uniform system of multinational en te rpr i se )  , Decision 56 ( in te rna t iona l  
road t ranspor ta t ion) ,  and Decision 94 (Andean main road system). 
Moreover, t h e  remaining countries,  by means of Decision 103, a l s o  modified 
t h e  s t a t u t e  o f  cap i t a l s .  - These amendments i n  general were already included i n  
preceding meetings he ld  i n  order t o  a t t r a c t  t h e  Chilean government. The modify- 
ing po in t s  .estabiished a r e  t h e  following: 
a. Subregional investment i s  considered as  na t i ona l  cap i t a l ,  but t h e  ap- 
proval of t h e  compeent nat ional  organism is required f o r  i t s  acceptance. 
b ,  Foreign en te rpr i ses  a r e ' ~ 1 l o w e d  t o  increase t h e  l i m i t  of p r o f i t  re- 
investment from 5 t o  7%. 
c. The l i m i t  o f  p r o f i t  remittance is  increased f r o m  1 4  t o  20%. However, 
competent na t iona l  organisms may authorize a greater  percentage. 
d. The c a p i t a l  of in te rna t iona l  financing organisms is defined as neu t ra l  
c ap i t a l  and, there fore ,  it w i l l  not  be estimated as nei ther  nat ional  nor foreign,  
regarding t h e  en t e rp r i s e  i n  which they pa r t i c ipa t e .  
ANNEX 
GENERAL OUTLOOK AND PROSPECTS* 
* 
Translated from "Coyuntura ~con6mica", October, 1976. 
BOLIVIA 
$ o l i v i a 8 s  economy is p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  exchange 
s i t u a t i o n  and t o  t h e  ba lance  of payments, Ac tua l ly ,  e x p o r t s  
o f  goods and s e r v i c e s  (exc luding  payment o f  f a c t o r s )  r e p r e s e n t  
28% of t h e  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p roduct ,  and imports ,  35%. Therefore ,  
t h e  country  I s  economic junc tu re  is c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p r i c e s  
of  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  e x p o r t  p roduc t s ,  mainly o i l  and t i n .  Thus, i n  
1972, B o l i v i a  f aced  a s i t u a t i o n  of  ba lance  of payments p a r t i c u l a r l y  
weak t h a t  r e s u l t e d  i n  a d r a s t i c  peso d e v a l u a t i o n  a t  t h e  end o f  
t h e  yea r .  S ince  then ,  a s u b s t a n t i a l  improvement of  e x p o r t  
revenues is exper ienced ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on  account  of o i l  and of 
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t i n  and z i n c  p r i c e s .  Although i n  1974 a n  unprecedented 
s u r p l u s  was r e g i s t e r e d ,  - when e x p o r t s  reached t h e  amount of  USS558 
m i l l i o n s ,  i n  1975 a n  ex t remely  h i g h  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t  of US$175 m i l l i o n s  
appears ,  caused by t h e  a c c e l e r a t e d  i n c r e a s e  of  impor t s  and t h e  
d rop  of  expor ted  va lue  of  21%. However, #C h i g h  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
revenues (US$87 m i l l i o n s )  and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  p u b l i c  d e b t  (US$55 
m i l l i o n s )  pe rmi t t ed  t h a t  t h e  exchange s i t u a t i o n  be maintained 
w i t h  a s l i g h t  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of reserves. 
Although B o l i v i a  is  a ' s m a l l  producer  and e x p o r t e r  of o i l  and 
n a t u r a l  gas ,  t h e  rise i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  of  hydrocarbons 
opened a n  impor tan t  oppor tun i ty  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  i ts  development 
L/ and r a p i d l y  i n c r e a s e  consumption and inves tment  , I n  1974 
dpproximately  USS125 m i l l i o n s  w e r e  accumulated i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e s e r v e s ,  more t h a n  three t imes  the. l e v e l s  p x e v a i l i n g  i n  p reced ing  
y e a r s ,  I n  1975  the s i t u a t i o n  d e t e r i o r a t e d ,  i n  p a r t ,  due t o  the 
p r i c e s  o f  some e x p o r t  minera l  p roduc t s ,  mainly z i n c  and antimony; 
i n  p a r t ,  t o  a r e d u c t i o n  of 18% i n  the expor ted  volume of t i n ;  
i n  part, because  a u n i l a t e r a l  p r i c e  of o i l  h i g h l y  inc reased  
prevented  the  c o u n t r y  f r o m  ma in t a in ing  a n  adequa te  e x p o r t  volume 
of hydrocarbons and f i n a l l y  fo rced  the g w e r r a e n t  t o  reduce  the 
priee once more; and i n  p a r t ,  because of  t h e  a c c e l e r a t e d  growth 
o f  imports  t h a t  i n  t w o  y e a r s  i nc reased  t o  more t h a n  double  the 
levels of 1973,  
I n  the c o n t e x t  of the Andean Group, B o l i v i a  is a mining coun t ry  
par e x c e l l e n c e ,  Mining has r ep re sen ted  approximate ly  15% of the 
g r o s s  i n t e r n a l  p roduc t ,  a much h i g h e r  f i g u r e  t h a n  t h e  rest of 
the c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  subreg ion .  I f  the e x p l o i t a t i o n  and 
r e f i n i n g  of  hydrocarbons i s  added, it m y  be s e e n  how t h e  sub- 
--.-.--- 
I n t e r n a l  s a v i n g s  i n  B o l i v i a  have exper ienced  movements s i m i l a r  
t o  t h o s e  o f  the ba lance  of  payments, F u r t h e r  t o  a p e r i o d  where 
there w a s  clear dependency on e x t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  f i n a n c e  
investment ,  i n  1974 sav ings  i nc reased  t o  21% o f  the g r o s s  
n a t i o n a l  p roduc t .  I n  1975, with the growth of i n t e r n a l  
consumption, t h i s  rate dec reased  a t  a n  e s t i m a t e d  v a l u e  of  19%. 
s o i l  r e p r e s e n t s  f o r  Bo l iv ia  approximately one f i f t h  of  its 
:evenue and product .  Such f a c t  is h i g h l y  important  i f  the 
rate of growth of t h e  g ross  i n t e r n a l  product  is s tudied .  The 
product inc reased  i n  average t o  5.7% annual ly  between 1971 and 
1975. Since mining product ion h a s  developed very  slowly, 
approximately a n  annual average of 0.7%, and r e p r e s e n t s  a  h igh  
ponderation i n  the i n t e r n a l  product,  the rhythm of economic 
growth i n d i c a t e d  reflects cons iderable  i n c r e a s e  rates i n  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  (7.1%) , commerce and s e r v i c e s  (6.5%)., and energy 
(6.O%), a s  w e l l  as r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  rates i n  the a g r i c u l t u r a l  
oec tor  (5.2%). I n  t u r n ,  manufacture and c o n s t r u c t i o n  show a 
slow growth rhythm of 4.0% and 5.1% r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
I n  spite of t h e  o i l  income, B o l i v i a  cont inues  t o  be a very poor 
country. Pe r  c a p i t a  income is  about  US$300; unemployment is 
genera l ized  ( n e a r  12%)j  t r a d i t i o n a l  a g r i c u l t u r e  p r e v a i l s  i n  most 
of the  land;  some important mines are beginning t o  show s i g n s  of 
exhaustion; the  manufacture e e c t o r  reflects a n  i n c i p i e n t  condi t ion ,  
i ts growth b e i n g  l imi ted  by the s i z e  of  the market, by t h e  
production models markedly i n e f f i c i e n t  and by t h e  c o s t  of 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  goods and inputs :  and mining e x p l o i t a t i o n  
has  been a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  of powerful l a b o r  
movements t h a t  have r e s u l t e d  i n  f r equen t  s t r i k e s  and lockouts .  
I 
Bolivia ,  a s  the major i ty  of t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  Andean Group, 
experienced a n  i n c r e d i b l e  a c c e l e r a t i o n  of i n f l a t i o n  i n  1974. 
The growth rate of p r i c e s  w a s  h i g h e ~  t h a n  38%, a f i g u r e  r e s u l t i n g  
from t h e  p r i c e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  markets,  t h e  monetization 
of inc reas ing  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  reserves and t h e  consequent growth 
of i n t e r n a l  demand, However, i n  1975, t h e  l e v e l  of p r i c e s  
s t a b i l i z e d  and t h e  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  decreased approximately t o  676, 
as t h e  r e s u l t  of  t h e  government's f i n a n c i a l  moderation and of t h e  
world recess ion .  Th i s  improvement i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  of 
p r i c e s  has  cont inued,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  annual  rate of i n f l a t i o n  
decreased t o  3% during t h e  f i r s t  months of t h e  year .  
During 1974 both  t h e  c e n t r a l  government's f inances  and those  of 
t h e  consol ida ted  pub l i c  s e c t o r  showed a s u b s t a n t i a l  improvement 
as t h e  - r e s u l t ,  i n  p a r t ,  of  t h e  s t a t e ' s  h igher  o i l  revenue, I n  
1975, t h e  unusual growth of p u b l i c  expenses and t h e  reduct ion  
of o i l  revenues r e s u l t e d  i n  a notable  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of t h e  balance 
of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  pub l i c  t r e a s u r y ,  Actua l ly ,  i n  1974, t h e  c e n t r a l  
government experienced a d e f i c i t  of $455 m i l l i o n s ,  while  i n  1975 
t h i s  f i g u r e  increased  t o  $801.0 mi l l ions .  
I n  1976, t h e  a c t i v i t y  of Bolivian economy r e f l e c t e d  an improvement 
i n  some economic indexes. Net i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s  a t  t h e  end 
of t h e  f i r s t  semester showed a recovery of 4% over t h e i r  l e v e l  
a t  t h e  end of 1975. Likewise,  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  four  months of 
1976, t h e  volume of crude o i l  e x p o r t s  showed an inc rease  with 
respect  to  the same period i n  1975.  F inal ly ,  the p r i c e  of 
k i n  experienced a c l e a r  recovery trend i n  June, i n  contrast  
wi th  p r i c e s  i n  force i n  June of t h e  preceding year, which 
resu l ted  i n  a drop of 12% of the  exported value.  
TABLE VI-4 
PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS ACCORDING 
TO COUNTRY OF O R I G I N  AND DESTINATION,  1970-1975 
I m p o r t s  E x p o r t s  -
1970-72 1973-75 1970-72 1973-75 
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  
A r g e n t i n a  
B r a z i l  
chile 
C o l o m b i a  
~ e x i c o  
Peru 
O t h e r s  
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  
Canada 
L 
united States  
Japan 
O t h e r s  
Source : International Monetary fund. 
CHILE 
C 
A .  Econanic Policy 
The p r i n c i p a l  ob jec t ives  t o  be reached by t h e  economic 
policy have been e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t ed  by the  Minister  of Finance, 
i n  the  document which includes the  min i s t ry ' s  programs f o r  1976 
and i n  the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  in tervent ion of March 11. Each source 
po in t s  out  t h e  equil ibrium i n  the  balance of payments, t he  control  
of i n f l a t i on ,  t h e  r eac t iva t ion  and pro tec t ion  of low income 
sec tors  a s  t h e  p r i o r i t y  object ives ,  
Economic a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  conscious t h a t  the  process of economic 
reac t iva t ion  w i l l  be slow during t h e  present  year,  as may be 
deduced from t h e  growth pro jec t ions  made by t h e  National Planning 
Office and by - t h e  statements of the Minister of Finance a t  t h e  
end of 1975. Most of them coincide i n  f i gu re s  f l uc tua t ing  around 
5 per cen t  as t h e  rate of growth f o r  1976. 
The economic s t r a t egy  is based on giving t h e  p r iva t e  ~ e c t o r  
t h e  most important r e spons ib i l i t y  i n  t h e  r eac t iva t ion ,  being the 
s t a t e ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  design and implement a coherent policy, 
and only t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  d i r e c t l y  i n  those i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  f o r  
c e r t a i n  reasons can not  be adequately covered by the  p r iva t e  
sector ,  
I n  the  framework indicated,  c e r t a i n  decis ions  on economic 
policy t h a t  are described below and t h a t  w i l l  serve t o  form a 
more accura te  op in ion  regarding the p r e s e n t  economic juncture 
ahd i ts  f u t u r e  prospects  have been made. 
The crisis of t h e  balance of payments t h a t  threa tened t h e  
country dur ing  1975, enforced a set of measures eminent ly 
r e s t r i c t i v e  r ega rd ing  impor ta t ions  and o t h e r  forms of f o r e i g n  
exchange expend i tu res  dur ing  t h e  p a s t  year ,  A t  t h e  same time, 
expor t s  and o t h e r  mechanisms t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  admit tance of 
f o r e i g n  exchange t o  the country we= encouraged. 
Both t y p e s  of op t ions  were maintained dur ing  t h e  f i rs t  q u a r t e r  
of t h e  p r e s e n t  yea r  and from t h e r e  modif ica t ions  t o  a l i v i a t e  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  w e r e  introduced,  exped i t ing  t h e  implementation of t h e  
s t r a t e g y  of f o r e i g n  axchange admittance,  which i s  one of t h e  
p i l l a r s  suppor t ing  - t h e  p reeen t  pol icy .  
I n  t h a t  sense ,  t h e  most important measures may be summarized 
as follows: 
1) During t h e  first q u a r t e r  of  this year ,  t h e  h i g h e s t  d o l l a r  
real p r i c e s  are reached s i n c e  1973, During t h e  second q u a r t e r ,  
a gradual  p rocess  of r e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e  peso begins.  
2 )  During t h e  month of February, the s i x t h  r e d u c t i o n  of customs 
t a r i f f s  becomes e f f e c t i v e ,  t h e  seventh becomes e f f e c t i v e  i n  
June, w i t h  w h i c h  the g o a l  of  having a maximum t a r i f f  of  35 
p e r  c e n t  and a minimum of 10 pe r  c e n t  w i l l  be reached. These 
l e v e l s  are s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower than  those  experienced a t  
r 
presen t  by the remaining c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  Andean market. 
3) I t  i s  decided not t o  request  t he  renegot ia t ion of t he  
fore ign deb t  t h a t  should be paid i n  1976, This implies 
an expenditure of approximately, 800 mi l l ion  do l l a r s ,  which 
w i l l  not a f f e c t  the equil ibrium of t h e  balance of payments, 
I n  the f i s c a l  area ,  policy decis ions  have aimed t o  t he  
object ive  of m i n t d i n i n g  t h e  1975 expenditure level-, a l t h o u ~ h  
reassigned, as it r e l a t e s  t o  p r i o r i t y  ob jec t ives ,  Consequently, 
t h e  f i nanc i a l  balance observed a t  the  end of 1975 i s  insured, 
The p r i n c i p a l  measures of economic pol icy  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  
a r ea  t h a t  have been implemented during t h e  semester a r e  t h e  
following: 
1) I n  t h e  reassignment contemplated i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  formulation 
of t h e  budget and t h e  subsequent complementation of May, t o  adapt 
it t o  t h e  r e a l  rates of i n f l a t i o n ,  p r i o r i t y  has  been given t o  
expenses f o r  housing, education, hea l th  ahd ch i ld  n u t r i t i o n  
programs, which is expected t o  mate r ia l i ze  during the  second 
semester, 
2 )  The t r i b u t a r y  s t ruc tu re  defined i n  t h e  corresponding reform 
which became e f f e c t i v e  i n  Apr i l  of l a s t  year is  maintained. 
3) The t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  p r iva t e  sec tor  of en t e rp r i s e s  i n  t h e  
possession of CORFO continued, 
This process was somehow i n  c o n f l i c t  with provisions of t h e  
Cartagena Agreement and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  Decision 24 ,  u n t i l  
pay of the  present  year. On t h a t  da te ,  spec i a l  au thor iza t ion  
was given t o  C h i l e  t o  sell  some of those e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  fore ign 
c a p i t a l  . 
A t  t h e  same t i m e  t h a t  en t e rp r i s e s  i n  t h e  s t a t e ' s  hands a r e  
reduced, a  management system cen t ra l i zed  on t h e  Ministry of 
Economics f o r  those e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  continue per ta in ing  t o  
the  s t a t e ,  is organized. 
I n  the  f i e l d  of t h e  market of c a p i t a l s ,  pol icy  measures 
have been or ien ted  towards i t s  expansion a s  we l l  a s  i t s  improve- 
ment, I n  c o n t r a s t  with what happened i n  1975, a  g r e a t e r  s t a b i l i t y  
i n  t he  r u l e s  o f  t h e  game i s  noted i n  t h i s  area.  
The main po l i cy  l i n e s  may be summarized a s  follows: 
1) Towards t h e  end of December 1975 the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  is released 
- 
a f t e r  t h e  Cent ra l  Bank t r i e d  a con t ro l  mechanism, which 
r e su l t ed  i n  a  recommendation of maximum capture  and d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  rates, This  was modified because t h e  resources 
switched towards an  in£ ormal market where monetary con t ro l  
i s  l o s t ,  
2 )  Reserve rates are increaeed and banks are allowed t o  make 
loans i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  depos i t s  (previously,  it was only a 
percentage of t h e  t e r m  capture)  with t h e  only l imi t a t i on  
of respec t ing  reserve  l eve l s ;  a t  t h e  same time the  Central  
Bank pays an  i n t e r e s t  f o r  these  amounts. 
3) The purchase of fore ign exchange i n  t he  fu ture  i s  eliminated 
which was the usual f inancing mechanism used by expor ters  
and is replaced by an authorizagion t o  t h e  commercial banks 
t o  g ran t  c r e d i t s  up t o  50 per c e n t  of FOB exports, ,  The 
measure t ends  t o  place export ing a c t i v i t y  i n  s imi la r  
condi t ions  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  o ther  a c t i v i t i e s  wi th . re fe rence  
t o  t h e  c r e d i t  cos t ,  
4) Towards t h e  end of t he  semester, the r e a d j u s t a b i l i t y  of c r e d i t  
opera t ions  exceeding 90 days i s  approved, Unt i l  that date,  
only operat ions  exceeding one year w e r e  readjus table ,  es t imat ing 
t h a t  t h a t  was one of t he  causes of t h e  real i n t e r e s t  high 
rates t h a t  those who contracted debts  permanently i n  the 
market of c a p i t a l s  a t  s h o r t  t e r m  w e r e  obliqed t o  pay - 
( i n f l a t i ona ry  expectat ions higher than t h e  e f f e c t i v e  i n f l a t i o n  
r a t e )  . 
I n  t h e  area of compensations, policy remains unchanged, 
grant ing readjustments every three months i n  accordance with 
pas t  i n f l a t i o n  rates, There  are sate exceptions where c e r t a i n  
s ec to r s  w e r e  favored, auch as teachers ,  persons between scales 
16 and 35 of t h e  Sole Scale of Compensations and some cases  
determined by t r i p a r t i t e  comanissions (workers, e n t e r p r i s e r s  
and government) , 
R e l a t i n g  t o  employment the p o l i c y  h a s  remained unchanged 
ir)  the e n s e  that  no innovat ions  wi th  respect t o  measures 
adopted dur ing  the p a s t  yea r  have been r e g i s t e r e d .  
S t i l l  i n  f o r c e  are the minimum employment p lan ,  i n c e n t i v e s  
t o  h i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  l a b o r  and t h e  r e v i s i o n  of the new Labor Code, 
Upon the p u b l i c a t i o n  of the l a t t e r ,  t h e  E n t e r p r i s e  and t h e  Tra in ing  
S o c i a l  S t a t u t e s  shall  become e f f e c t i v e ,  bo th  of g r e a t  importance 
t o  the labor  s e c t o r .  
B. R e s u l t s  ob ta ined  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  semester o f  1976, 
F i s c a l  S i t u a t i o n .  
The n a t i o n a l  currency budget p r e s e n t s  a  s u r p l u s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
3.5 per c e n t  of the expense. During t h e  same per iod  i n  1975, there 
was a def ic i t  of 8.3, m d  i n  1474, 35.4 pe r  cen t .  
- 
The budget i n  f o r e i g n  cur rency  p r e s e n t s  a d e f i c i t  equ iva len t  
t o  43.6 pe r  c e n t ,  which, however, is more f avorab le  than  last 
y e a r ' s  a i t u a t i o n  when the d e f i c i t  was 64.9 per c e n t  f o r  the 
same per iod.  
The favorab le  r e s u l t  i n  n a t i o n a l  currency is the product  of 
t h e  r educ t ion  a t  the  expendi ture  l e v e l  and, a t  the same time, 
the inc rease  i n  revenues as a consequence of the t r i b u t a r y  reform, 
I n  tu rn ,  the unfavorable  s i t u a t i o n  as it r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  
currency budget i s  expla ined  due t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  experienced i n  
amor t i za t ion  payments of t h e  deb t ,  
r 
2 ,  Foreign t r a d e  s i t u a t i o n  
The f o r e i g n  t r a d e  achievements are undoubtedly t h e  most 
obvious obta ined  by t h e  economic po l i cy ,  From a s i t u a t i o n  of 
g r e a t  d e f i c i t  i n  1975 w e  have passed t o  a comfortable s i t u a t i o n  
i n  1976, e s t i m a t i n g  a s u r p l u s  exceeding 300 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s ,  
Favorable r e s u l t s  are due t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  of  copper p r i c e s  
i n  r/Larch and t o  the i nc rease  of phys ica l  major mining expor t s ;  
t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  of non t r a d i t i o n a l  e x p o r t s ;  and t o  t h e  admittance 
of  c a p i t a l s  by v i r t u e  of A r t i c l e  14 of Decree-Law 1272, 
AS' t o  disbursements,  it is necessary to  p o i n t  o u t  i n  t h e  
first p lace  t h e  s e r v i c e  of t h e  fo re ign  deb t  t h a t  between 
amor t iza t ions  and i n t e r e s t s  r ep resen t  an amount c l o s e  t o  800 
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s ,  Furthermore, it i s  es t imated  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  
- 
of impor ta t ions  could be s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of 1975, which would 
imply a s u b s t a n t i a l  inc rease  dur ing  t h e  latter p a r t  of t h e  year ,  
3, Monetary s i t r a t i o n  and market of c a p i t a l s  
Monetary expansion h a s  been caused almost exc lus ive ly  by 
t h e  i ssuances  of t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank, The banking m u l t i p l i c a t o r  
h a s  had a ve ry  moderate inf luence ,  produce of  h igh  r e s e r v e  r a t e s  
and, u n t i l  May, a q u a n t i t a t i v e  c o n t r o l  of d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  
A s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  above, t o  e x p l a i n  the expansion of money, 
should be l i m i t e d  t o  observe t h e  sources  o f  t h e  issuance,  Upon 
examination of t h e  amounts it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  exchange opera t ions  
I 
account f o r ,  t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t ,  the issuance of the f i r s t  
I semester. 
Regarding t h e  market of c a p i t a l s ,  a  t r e n d  towards a g r e a t e r  
competi t ion i s  noted, as a r e s u l t  of the measures adopted i n  t h e  
banks'  r e s e r v e  rates. Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  may be observed 
is t h a t  i n  view of the h igh  i n t e r e s t  rates p r e v a i l i n g  i n t e r n a l l y ,  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  admit tance of f o r e i g n  resources  i s  produced, which 
e x p l a i n s  i n  p a r t  t h e  accumulation of r e s e r v e s  and t h e  monetary 
expansion due t o  exchange opera t ions .  
4. P r i c e  s i t u a t i o n  
The rate o f  i n f l a t i o n  dur ing  t h i s  f i r s t  semester reached e n  
average of approximately 11 per c e n t  per month, which exceeds by 
almost  t h r e e  p o i n t s  - the rate r e g i s t e r e d  dur ing  t h e  second semester 
of l a s t  year .  Should the comparison be made w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  semester 
of 1975, t h e  improvement is s i g n i f i c a n t  s i n c e  a t  tha t  t i m e  t h e  
average i n f l a t i o n  w a s  18 per cen t .  
Taking i n t o  cons ide ra t ion  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  cond i t ions  when 
comparing the rates of i n f l a t i o n  of the second semester of one 
yea r  w i t h  those  of t h e  subsequent yea r ,  it may be s a i d  t h a t  
regarding  c o n t r o l  of i n f l a t i o n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  has g radua l ly  improved 
s i n c e  a l l  p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  1976 p o i n t  t o  a maximum rate of zp- 
proximately 180 per cen t ,  which means an  important  advance when 
comparing it w i t h  the 340 pe r  c e n t  of 1975. 
r 
5, Revenue s i t u a t i o n  
The l e v e l  of real wages and -1aries has experienced a 
s l i g h t  improvement as the consequence of the readjustment  p o l i c y  
and the lower rates of  i n f l a t i o n ,  
6, Employment s i t u a t i o n  
A f t e r  a c o n s t a n t  inc rease  i n  the unemployment rate which 
s t a r t e d  i n  September of 1974, a decrease is  experienced i n  June. 
The percentage  of unemployed t h a t  i n  March reached 19.8 per c e n t  
o f  the l a b o r  f o r c e ,  decreased i n  June t o  18 p e r  cent .  However, 
the unemployment rate cont inues  t o  be high,  
7, Product ion s i t u a t i o n  
Product ion dur ing  t h e  semester h a s  experienced a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e  
when compared w i t h  a c t i v i t y  levels r e g i s t e r e d  dur ing  1975's  - 
second semester, Should the a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  of t h e  f i r s t  semester 
be  maintained, a n  imprwement of approximately 4 per c e n t  i n  t h e  
g r o s s  i n t e r n a l  product  would be observed, 
The most impor tant  i n c r e a s e  w i l l  probably be observed i n  
mining w i t h  8 t o  10 per c e n t  per year, 
I n d u s t r i a l  product ion  is a t  levels that, should they be 
maintained f o r  t h e  rest of the year ,  would show a n  inc rease  of 
4 t o  5 p e r  c e n t ,  
Cons t ruc t ion  is a n  a c t i v i t y  whose l e v e l  should improve during 
t h e  second semester w i t h  r e l a t i o n  t o  the l e v e l s  of t h e  f i r s t  
I 
semester,  which w e r e  r a t h e r  low. 
Agriculture w i l l  not  experience an a c t i v i t y  l e v e l  i n  1976 
d i f f e r e n t  from that of 1975. 
C. F ina l  Conclusions 
During t h e  first semester, Chilean economy presents  a s  
fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a s l i g h t  increase  i n  i ts  a c t i v i t y  
l eve l s ,  as w e l l  as a consolidat ion of some ob jec t ives  which had 
been suggested a t  t h e  end of l a s t  year, Such i s  the case  of the 
. external  balance and t h e  f i s c a l  budget i n  cur ren t  currency. 
Perhaps, more than t h e  magnitude of t h e  pos i t i ve  s igns  
observed, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they appear i n  p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  var iables ,  
wi th  no exception, should be valued, 
There is t h e  impression t h a t  i n  the second ha l f  of t h e  year,  
the trend ind ica ted  up t o  now w i l l  continue, i n  t e r m s  of a slow 
- 
recovery, accompanied by a consolidat ion of f i s c a l  and fore ign 
commerce balances  and a reduction i n  t h e  r a t e  of i n f l a t i on .  
D . Economic integration 
The most re levan t  events  occurred i n  Chi le  during the  present  
year  are t h e  disagreements w i t h  other  member count r ies  of t h e  
Andean Pact, 
1. Controversy and i ts causes 
The main controvers ies  revolve around the treatment t o  fore ign 
investments, t h e  t a r i f f s  t h a t  the s i x  countr ies  should apply t o  
merchandise a r r i v i n g  from t h e  rest of t he  world and t h e  j o i n t  
# 
i n d u s t r i a l  programming, . . 
The crucial  point of the debate is Decision 24,  which regulates 
the treatment of foreign capi ta l  and of trademarks, patents, 
l icenses and royal t ies ,  
The amendments t o  t h i s  Decision requested by Chile are 
fundamentally the following : 
a) Elimination of the  14 per cent top t o  the remittance of profi ts ,  
b) Elimination of the clause tha t  compels foreign enterprises t o  
transform in to  national or mixed, within a term of f i f t een  
years , 
c) Elimination of the prohibition t o  s e l l  national enterprises 
t o  foreign capitals.  
d) To exonerate enterprises tha t  are  not interested i n  taking 
advantage of - the subregional market, from the  applicabili ty 
of provisions of Decision 24. 
c) Expansion of the number of 'basic sectors (extractive, energy 
and forestry)  exempted i n  t h i s  norm. 
To understand the arguments given t o  jus t i fy  these requests, 
it is necessary t o  review Chile 's  economic history.  
During the past for ty  years, with s l igh t  exceptions, Chile 
has followed an economic development scheme of substi tution of 
imports. The basic  idea was t o  produce internal ly the goods 
tha t  were being imported: it was considered t h a t  i n  t h i s  way 
the country could develop and they would save the limited foreign 
f 
exchange tha t  they have had normally. 
This process was accompanied by an exchange policy t h a t  
*ring many periods of t i m e  kept the  r a t e  of exchange under- 
estimated, by means of which it was .permitted t o  im$ort cap i t a l  
goods and raw materials  needed for  the  indus t r ia l iza t ion  being 
promoted, But t h i s  type of exchange a l s o  served a s  an incentive 
f o r  the  importation of a l l  types of goods. To maintain t h i s  
policy would have l e d  t o  a constant d e f i c i t  i n  the  balance of 
payments. To prevent t h i s ,  a t a r i f f  policy was applied, which 
consisted i n  the prohibit ion o r  appliance of extremely high 
customs t a r i f f s  t o  the importation of those products t h a t  was 
estimated Chile could produce in te rna l ly ,  
With these measures, the problem of the balance of payments 
would be solved, in t e rna l  production would be promoted and protected 
- 
from foreign competition, But t h i s  referred only t o  the sector 
t h a t  would subs t i tu t e  importations. 
The exporter sector experienced a grea t  decrease i n  i t s  
exporting p o s s i b i l i t i e s  s ince with the underrated type of exchange 
it could not cover its in terna l  production costs, 
Very l o w  customs t a r i f f s ,  almost inexis tent ,  were applied 
t o  basic  c ~ o d i t i e s .  T h i s  was a measure intended t o  maintain 
the pr ices  of these  products r e l a t i v e l y  low t o  prevent the  r i s e  
i n  the cos t  of l iv ing  and t o  maintain products within reach of 
t h e  grea t  consumer mass. 
* 
I n  these conditions, t h e  assignment of resources moved 
C 
towards production of sumptuary products and products t h a t  
could he dispensed with, importation of which was prohibited, 
o r  had excessively high t a r  i f f  s, and consequently, t h e i r  in te rna l  
pr ices  w e r e  high and p ro f i t t ab le  t o  be produced, I t  a l s o  moved 
towards subs t i tu t ion  import a c t i v i t i e s ,  but these were condemned 
t o  the service of in te rna l  markets which were r e l a t ive ly  small, 
s ince the exchange policy inhibi ted these a c t i v i t i e s  from expanding 
t h e i r  production by going outside because with the  type of exchange, 
su f f i c i en t  r e tu rns  t o  cover production cos ts  could not be obtained, 
Let ' s  observe now what happens with the  Andean Pact. I t  was 
contemplated t h a t  with i t s  creat ion markets could be added and 
new oxygen could be injected t o  the  process of import subst i tut ion 
(see  Table VIII-5). But there  was no awareness t h a t  the  protection 
expected by t h e  Subregion with r e o p c t  t o  th i rd  countries would 
subs t i tu t e  cheaper currents of impartation (from th i rd  countries 
tha t ,  i n  addit ion,  were generating revenues f o r  the  treasury 
because of t a r i f f s ) ,  f o r  other more expensive currents of i m -  
por ta t ion ( those of the  members of the Subregion), t h a t  would 
compete only because intraregional  t a r i f f s  would be inexis tent ,  
The higher the  common external  t a r i f f s ,  the  greater  the  cost  of 
the  welfare of t h i s  exchange w i l l  be. 
, 
TABLE Vlll  - 5 
i 
CHILEAN TRADE WITH THE ANDEAN AREA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ALALC 
(thousands of dollars) 
Imparts (regist ries 
executed) 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Andean Area 
Argentina 
Brazi 1 
Exports (shipments) 
Bolivia . 
Colombia 
Ecuador ' 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Andean Area 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Source: Central Bank of Chile 
2. Treatment t o  f o r e i g n  capital 
I 
The scheme of t h e  Andean Pact is ve ry  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  
followed by Chi l e  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  consequently Chilean a u t h o r i t i e s  
do n o t  wish t o  commit themselves a t  r e g i o n a l  scale regarding  
t h a t  scheme from which Chi l e  is devia t ing .  
This  h a s  been ind ica ted  by t h e  Minis te r  of Economics, Serg io  
d e  Castro,  who states t h a t  the economic development of a country 
does n o t  depend only on e f f i c i e n t  and coherent  economic p o l i c i e s  
b u t  t h a t  it needs, i n  add i t ion ,  another  i n g r e d i e n t  which i s  
investments. H e  f u r t h e r  states t h a t  t o  genera te ,  through i n t e r n a l  
savings ,  t h e  investments  needed by Chi le  t o  grow a t  a minimum of 
7 per c e n t  p e r  year ,  t h e  consumption of  t h e  p resen t  popula t ion  
would have t o  be s a c r i f i c e d  a t  a g r e a t  e x t e n t ,  and consequently 
it is imperat ive t h a t  f o r e i g n  investment e n t e r  our  country t o  
be added t o  the  e f f o r t  of the i n t e r n a l  sav ings  and p e r m i t  t h e  
reaching  of t h e  l e v e l s  o f  investment t h a t  are needed. 
The Min i s t e r  of Economics e s t a b l i s h e d  that  f o r e i g n  investment 
c o n t r i b u t e s  n o t  only  wi th  capital goods and f i n a n c i n g  c a p i t a l ,  
I t  c o n t r i b u t e s ,  fur thermore,  w i t h  technology, human t a l e n t ,  
managing a b i l i t y ,  knowledge on markets and a b i l i t y  t o  penetra-te 
s a i d  markets, H e  expresses  t ha t  t o  a t t r a c t  t h i s  investment it 
i s  necessary t o  modify Decis ion 24  and make it more f l e x i b l e .  
For these reasons, t h e  Government of Chile proposes t o  
change t h e  w a y  i n  which t h e  fore ign or nat ional  qua l i t y  of an 
a c t i v i t y  is defined,  and t h e  ob l iga t ion  t o  transform foreign 
en te rpr i ses  i n t o  mixed o r  nat ional  en t e rp r i s e s  a t  the end of 
a ce r t a in  period of t i m e .  H e  proposes t h a t  such de f in i t i on  
be made based on the  l o c a l  aggregate value and not i n  terms 
of the c a p i t a l ' s  property, which cons t i t u t e s  only one of the  
productive f a c t o r s  involved i n  a determined a c t i v i t y .  On the  
other hand, it is ins i s t ed  t h a t  it does not have any sense t o  
compel a  country t o  use its own l imi ted resources t o  acquire 
en te rpr i ses  a l ready  developed and t h a t ,  on the  other  hand, it 
impedes the  admittance of new c a p i t a l s  s ince  the investors  would 
not be pleased wi th  t h e  idea t o  be forced t o  t r a n s f e r  the  ownership 
- 
of t h e i r  assets, Furthermore, i n  such condit ions,  t he  foreign 
investor  would no t  see any incent ive  t o  develop h i s  a c t i v i t y  t o  
the maximum of h i s  po ten t i a l  or t o  introduce new techniques. 
In te rna l  c r i t i c i s m s  t o  t h i s  Chilean pos i t ion  indicate  t h a t  
r i g i d  norms do no t  impede the  admittance of fore ign investment 
t o  the extent  that  they a r e  c l e a r  and s t a b l e  and t b a t ,  on the 
contrary, the excess  of admittance or  of l i b e r a l i t y  i n  f r o n t  
of t h i s  c a p i t a l  confuses i t s  admittance o r  promotes speculat ive 
and shor t  term investments, s ince  the  investor  always th inks  
t h a t  a  very advantageous framework can not  be maintained f o r  a 
r 
long time, I t  is added t h a t  t o  the ex ten t  t h a t  it is convenient 
L 
t o  the fo re ign  investor ,  provided t h a t  income may be derived 
from h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  he would not mind t o  associate with na t iona l  
inves tors ,  Final ly ,  it is affirmed t h a t  f o r  investments based 
on t h e  exp lo i t a t i on  of bas i c  resources and f o r  exports  ou ts ide  
t he  area ,  Decision 24 contemplates a more l i b e r a l  treatment.  
3, Common ex te rna l  t a r i f f s  
Regarding common ex te rna l  t a r i f f s ,  the  Chilean pos i t ion  i s  
based on t h e  convict ion t h a t  t h e  development model baeed on the  
indiscriminated subs t i t u t i on  of imports would have reached i ts  
conclusion and t h a t  p resen t ly  a reasonable e f f e c t i v e  p ro tec t ion  
not  a s  high as t h e  one i n  exis tence ,  would be enough, 
C r i t i c i s m  -to this pos i t ion  ind i ca t e s  t h a t  f o r  an underdeveloped 
country r e l a t i v e l y  twparated from i n d u s t r i a l  c en t e r s  and cen te rs  
of g rea t e r  consumption, it would be very d i f f i c u l t  t o  pene t ra te  
fore ign markets of d i f f i c u l t  access, many t ims protected,  capt ive  
of g rea t  en t e rp r i s e s  and s t rongly  s table .  On t h e  o the r  hand, it 
is affirmed t h a t  a t  any r a t e ,  t h e  admittance should be slower 
and t o  p r o f i t  f i r s t  from the  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  of t h e  Andean market 
and then th ink  of reaching more remote and complex markets, 
A s  can be appreciated,  t he  disagreements with t he  Andean Group 
a r e  complex and go f a r t h e r  than simple t echnica l  considerat ions,  
since dif ferent  strategic  conceptions of development and 
hternational  policy are involved. 
Finally, w e  wish t o  point out that the common external 
t a r i f f  and the sectorial  development programs were not approved 
within the stipulated terms. 
COLOMBIA 
A f t e r  a pe r iod  of  a c c e l e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  inc rease  r a t e  of p r i c e s ,  
t h e  government managed t o  reduce it t o  l e v e l s  lower than  20% 
i n  1975, through r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary p o l i c i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  semester of  t h e  year .  However, t h i s  achievement 
of economic p o l i c y  was accompanied by the lower actual econony 
growth of r e c e n t  years ,  Poss ib ly ,  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary 
p o l i c y  as w e l l  as t h e  adopt ion of a t r i b u t a r y  reform a t  t h e  end 
of 1974, mainly d i r e c t e d  t o  inc rease  f i s c a l  c o l l e c t i o n s  and g ive  
greater p r o g r e s s i v i t y  t o  t axes ,  cont r ibuted  t o  accentua te  t h e  
r e c e s s i v e  c y c l e  of t h e  economy i n  a moment when i n d u s t r i a l ,  
cons t ruc t ion  and commercial s e c t o r s  w e r e  f a c i n g  a decrease  i n  
demand and an-excess ive  accumulation of i n v e n t o r i e s ,  
The behavior o f  t h e  economy i n  1975 was l ikewise  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  
world r e c e s s i o n  which, from mid-1974, began t o  show by c l o s i n g  
e x t e r n a l  markets f o r  some products  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r .  
I n  t u r n ,  t h e  e x t e r n a l  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  count ry  became more 
vulnerable  when, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  gaso l ine  was imported and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  because of t h e  p r i c e  f a l l  t r end  experienced by 
c o f f e e  p r i c e s  up  t o  J u l y  1975, when p rospec t s  changed s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
due t o  t h e  f r o s t  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  B r a z i l ' s  c o f f e e  production. 
The occurrence of t h e  above f a c t s  and t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  they  c rea ted  
i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  were determinant  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  low economic 
growth during 1975, In  consequence, i n  r e a l  terms w i t h  respect  
t o  1974, FEDESARROLLO estimates regarding the decrease of indus t r ia l  
production, 2 -1%; of the commercial. sector ,  4.0%; while the  area 
constructed i n  the main c i t i e s  decreased approximately 31.9%. 
Only in  the ag r i cu l tu ra l  sector  a sa t i s fac tory  increase of 6.5% 
i n  the r e a l  value of production was regis tered.  This behavior 
of the  economy ref lec ted  i n  a drop i n  the value of imports and 
exports of manufactured products, and i n  an increase of agr icu l tura l  
exports,  Par t icu lar ly  as the r e s u l t  of the greater  value of coffee 
exports during the  fourth quarter  of 1975 and of the  reduced 
l eve l s  of foreign exchange expenses resu l t ing  from the low volume 
of imports, t h e  Bank of the Republic's net  internat ional  reserves 
increased by USS118 mill ions during the year, - 
Regarding public finances, the produce of the  t r ibu tary  reform 
ant ic ipated a grea ter  par t ic ipa t ion  of the national  government 
i n  the economy through the expense, a s  well a s  a decided act ion 
t o  improve its finances, However, addit ional  income from the 
reform was not u t i l i zed  i n  ambitious programs of public invest- 
ment t ha t  would serve a s  testimony of the  effect iveness  of the 
government's f i s c a l  policy and of the purpose t o  r ed i s t r ibu te  
income i n  favor of the  poorer population groups. Furthermore, 
on December 31 1975, the problems of budgetary and f inancia l  
unbalance s t i l l  existed and the  government was forced t o  seek 
i n f l a t i o n a r y  c r e d i t s  from t h e  Centra l  Bank t o  cover p a r t  of 
i$s cash d e f i c i t ,  
I n  mat te r s  of f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  it i s 'wor th  po in t ing  ou t  t h e  
determinat ion of  t he  present  government t o  l i m i t  monetary and 
c a p i t a l  markets , to  reduce d i spers ion  of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and 
t o  ob ta in  i n  the long term the  d e f i n i t i v e  establ ishment  of t h e  
s o  ca l l ed  open market operat ions.  Although the government has  
succeeded p a r t i a l l y  i n  its purpose t o  reduce d i spe r s ion  of i n t e r e s t  
rates, it has  had less success regarding t he  adequate separa t ion  
between the monetary market and t h e  market of c a p i t a l s ;  while  
l i q u i d i t y  of c e r t a i n  papers ha s  been el iminated,  in termediar ies  
spec ia l i zed  i n  t h e  market of c a p i t a l s  have been permit ted t o  
act i n  the monetary market t o  which they d id  no t  have access 
i n  the  past, On the other  hand, papers crea ted  f o r  t h e  open 
market opera t ions  have not  been f u l l y  used s i n c e  t h e r e  are i n  
the market other papers  wi th  g r e a t e r  y i e l d  and of s i m i l a r  o r  
minor term, 
For 1976, a v a i l a b l e  information on t h e  economy evolut ion  dur ing 
t h e  f i r s t  s ix  months of t h e  year  confirms estimates on the eventual  
progress  of product ion a c t i v i t y ,  wi th  the exception of pub l ic  
investment, mining, and urban p r i v a t e  const ruct ion ,  I n  o the r  
s ec to r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  indust ry  and commerce, t h e  e f f e c t s  of an  
r 
inc rease  i n  t he  aggregate demand began t o  show, caused by l a r g e r  
coffeegrowers '  revenues, and by t h e  reopening of  some e x t e r n a l  
nqrke t s  upon t e rmina t ion  of the recess ion  of i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
coun t r i e s .  Economic behavior  dur ing  the f i rs t  h a l f  of  t h e  year  
and t h e  p rospec t s  f o r  the second semester sugges t  an  inc rease  
i n  t h e  g r o s s  i n t e r n a l  product  of approximately 7.5%, a s  w e l l  as 
a probable r educ t ion  o f  urban open unemployment, which h a s  been 
est imated at iipproximiitely 12% f o r  the l a s t  montns. However, 
it is a mat t e r  of  concern i n  the medium t e r m  how the inc rease  
i n  aggregate  demand h a s  no t  been corresponded y e t  by investments 
i n  f ixed  c a p i t a l  and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  on the p a r t  of the p r i v a t e  
and pub l i c  s e c t o r ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
During the p r e s e n t  yea r  government p o l i c y  and economic a c t i v i t y ,  
i n  genera l ,  have c i r c l e d  around even t s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of co f fee ,  
Notwithstanding the a n t i c i p a t e d  recovery of the a c t i v i t y  of 
impor ta t ions  as t h e  consequence mainly of a wide program of 
impor te l ibe ra t ion ,  it is  es t ima ted  t h a t  the e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
inc rease  of average e x t e r n a l  co f fee  p r i c e s  from US$0,78 p e r  
pound during t h e  1974-1975 c o f f e e  year  t o  US$1,30 i n  1975-1976, 
w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a n  inc rease  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s  of approxi- 
m t e l y  USS600 m i l l i o n s ,  consequent ly d u p l i c a t i n g  t h e  l e v e l  reached 
i n  December of 1975, Th i s  r e se rve  inc rease ,  o r i g i n a t i n g  an 
equ iva len t  expansion of the monetary base, imposes on monetary 
au thor i t i e s  the  need t o  adopt measures t o  neutral ize  i ts  
bossible impact on the in te rna l  pr ice  level .  
I t  has been agreed between coffeegrowers and the  government 
t o  t ransfer  some addi t ional  resources t o  the Coffee National 
Fund and t o  the  national  treasury;  t o  invest  a subs tan t ia l  
part  of the Fund's revenues i n  bonds of economic development 
and some coffee foreign exchange i n  t i t les  from the Bank of 
the  Republic t h a t  can be exchanged; and t o  c rea te  coffee savings 
t i t l e s ,  TAC, t o  be used by the National Coffeegrowers Federation 
and by pr ivate  exporters f o r  payment t o  coffee growers of a pa r t  
of the  higher coffee price,  or fo r  the  purchase of foreign ex- 
change f o r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes. 
- 
I n  addition, the  government i s  engaged i n  complying with a 
cont rac t ionis t  policy of the  public expense. Therefore during 
the first semester of 1976 it postponed an important pa r t  of i t s  
investment programs, t o  be able  t o  bring up t o  date  the payment 
of i t s  immediate obligations and t o  reduce t o  the minimum the 
t reasury 's  d e f i c i t .  I t  is possible t h a t  during the r e s t  of the 
year, the  government would not seek loans from the  Central Bank 
t h a t  would worsen the problem of a too rapid growth of the  means 
of payment. Consequently, the  carrying out of a policy t h a t  
grants  special  p r i o r i t y  t o  pr ice  s t a b i l i t y  and minor importance . 
t o  the  object ives  of economic growth and income redis t r ibut ion  
6hrough mechanisms of public expense, is evident. 
I n  s p i t e  of the  government's e f f o r t s ,  the  present increase of 
the  means of payment and the  accumulated r i s e  of price indexes 
during the f i r s t  p a r t  of the  year, suggest an i n f l a t i o n  exceeding 
22%. 1976,  i n  contras t  with the preceding year, would be 
characterized then by a recovery of production ac t iv i ty ,  a 
decrease of urban open unemployment, a less favorable balance 
of payments, and an accelerat ion i n  the growth ra t e  of national  
pr ices ,  Prospects i n  the medium t e r m  s h a l l  depend, mainly, on 
the success of the government t o  control  in f la t ion ,  on the 
behavior of t h e  private sector  as it r e l a t e s  t o  the extension 
of production capaci ty ,  and on the  e f f i c i e n t  management on the 
p a r t  of the  publ ic  sector of i t s  expense programs, 
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Backqround 
c From 1965 t o  1971 t h e  Ecuadorian economy was in a state of  ex- 
pectancy f o r  t h e  begining of o i l  production i n  t he  ea s t e rn  area  
of the country. During t h i s  period, the  movement of the na t iona l  
product was p r a c t i c a l l y  neg l ig ib le ,  s ince  it showed a growth 
a t  t h e  cur ren t  p r i c e  of  US$ 351 mi l l ion  d o l l a r s ,  while t he  in-  
crease per cap i ta  was only eleven do l l a r s .  I n  r e k l  terms, the 
growth per cap i t a  was negative s ince  t h e  increase  i n  the  inf la- 
t i o n  r a t e  was higher.  During th is  per iod a percentage reduction 
of  t he  na t iona l  consumption and an  increase  i n  the gross  build-up 
of f ixed c a p i t a l  were observed, The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of consumption 
i n  t he  GNP was reduced from 37% i n  1965 t o  74'k i n  1970, and t o  91% 
i n  1971. On the  o ther  hand, t he  c a p i t a l  build-up increased i t s  
pa r t i c ipa t ion  in 11% i n  1965 t o  19% i n  1970, and t o  26% i n  1971. 
The flow o f  long-term fore ign cap i t a l ,  from investment i n  t h e  
o i l  industry, was highly s i g n i f i c a n t ,  I n  1965 t h i s  flow reached 
t h e  amount o f  US$19 mil l ion,  s tepping up t o  U~$110 mi l l ion  i n  
1970, and US$182 mi l l i on  i n  1971, The importat ion of c a p i t a l  
goods and t r a n s p o r t  equipment, i n  turn ,  grew from US$46 mi l l ion  
i n  1965 t o  US$82 mil l ion  i n  1970, and US$114 mi l l ion  i n  1971. 
Likewise, t h e  publ ic  sec tor  began spending i n  advance t o  the o i l  
boom, which caused the  fore ign deb t  t o  grow from uS$120 mi l l ion  
i n  1965 t o  U s 2 2 9  mi l l i on  in 1970, and t o  US$248 mi l l ion  i n  
1971, The country i n  general  considered t h e  o i l  production 
L 
as t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  g e t  o f f  a prolonged s t a t i ona ry  pre-in- 
d u s t r i a l  s t a t e ,  within  which t h e  na t iona l  economic a c t i v i t y  
had been developing, I n  f ac t ,  as o f  1972 t h e  change of t h e  
economic i n d i c a t o r s  i s  c l e a r  and dramatic, however, the  pro- 
jec t ions  of a c t u a l  growth could n o t  be foreseen in t h e i r  whole 
dimension even by the  economists' most op t imi s t i c  fo recas t s ,  
B, The O i l  Boom Durinq 1972-1974 
I n  August 1972 t h e  export of Ecuadorian o i l  began through t h e  
transandean p ipe l ine  and t h i s  launched t h e  nboomw t h a t  l a s t e d  
approximately u n t i l  t h e  end of 1974, The g ross  na t iona l  product 
jurnped up considerably, from US$ 1,776 mi l l ion  i n  1972 t o  
US$ 3,476 m i l l i o n  i n  1974, with an intermediate f igure  of 
US$2,446 m i l l i o n  i n  1973, Thus, during these  two years  t h e  
product increased in 95% which g ives  an idea of t h e  meaning 
of  t h e  o i l  boom for Ecuador (Table 11-1)- This growth, a t  
cur ren t  p r i c e s ,  was r e f l ec t ed  i n  an increase  i n  the  product 
per  cap i ta  o f  USS278 i n  1972 t o  US$ 508 in 1974, 
Due t o  t h e  l a c k  of investments, t h e  r a t e  of g ros s  build-up of 
f ixed c a p i t a l  was n o t  considerably increased, and it remained 
r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  i n  i t s  percentage r a t i o  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
product. During 1972 this r e l a t i o n  was o f  t he  order  o f  22% 
, 
and it increased t o  23% i n  1973, dropping the rea f t e r  t o  21% 
6. 
i n  1974, However, t he  maintenance of this r e l a t i v e l y  high 
r a t e  represented a steady growth of t h e  na t iona l  economy, 
With the  o i l  revenues a sustained incentive was thus being 
generated f o r  new investments, As f a r  as consumption i s  
concerned, it should be pointed ou t  that p r iva t e  consumption 
was reduced i n  terms of its share in the product, maintaining 
the  trend observed between 1965 and 1971, This pa r t i c ipa t ion  was 
reduced from 7@A t o  66% between 1972 and 1974, 
During the  same period, Ecuador's t rade  balance r e f l ec t ed  an  
unprecedented f a c t  i n  i ts  contemporary h i s tory  when during three  
consecutive years  a surplus was achieved of the  order o f  U S S 8  
mi l l ion i n  1972, USS135 mil l ion i n  1973 and US$92 mi l l ion  i n  
1974. The tenns of exchange turned favorable as w e l l  as with 
other  o i l  exporting countries,  The foreign trade, i n  terms 
of gross volume, showed an increase of over 200% from 1972 t o  
1974, as a r e s u l t  both of t h e  boom of o i l  production and the  
increase i n  o i l  p r ices ,  
The capacity t o  use up the new revenues from the  in te rna t iona l  
t rade was complete, since, while i n  1973 the developments took 
the country by surpr ise ,  i n  1974 imports increased t o  US$958 
million, compared t o  US$397 mil l ion i n  1973, Exports increased 
from US$326 mil l ion t o  US$532 mil l ion between 1972 and 1973 
I 
54. 
and doubled up i n  1974, reaching the amount of US$l,OSO 
million, These increases were re f lec ted  in changes in  
C 
its makeup, and Ecuador changed from an economy based on 
ag r i cu l tu ra l  exports t o  one based on o i l  production. 
TABLE 1-1 
RATES O F  G R m H  OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1971-1975 
( 7; 1 
1971 1972 1973 19 74 1975 
G N P (current  values) 19-4 14.4 36.1 44.9 18.1 
G N P (constant values) 5 - 8  5.7 18.3 13.6 5.3 
G N P (constant values) 6.9 3.9 16.6 13.1 8.8 
Souxce : Ecuador Central Bank and estimates of the  ~ounda t ion  
f o r  Education and Development, Ecuador, 
Banana, f o r  example, which made up 40.2% of e-rts in 1972, 
was only 10,eL i n  1974, while o i l ,  on the  other  hand, increas- 
ed its share from 18.0!!!! in 1972 t o  58.6% i n  1974, 
Other economic indicators  should be emphasized f o r  the  period 
1972-1974, The s t a t e  budget increased from Us$2%million t o  
USS474 mil l ion;  current  revenues of the cent ra l  government 
went up from US$221 t o  US$453 mil l ion;  the  internat ional  
monetary reserve increased from USS128 mill ion t o  USS339 
mill ion;  the  currency, from USS297 mil l ion t o  USS535 million, 
while banking c r e d i t  doubled from US$578 mi l l i on  t o  US$1,018; 
t h e  i n f l a t i o n  during t he  period was 45%. 30% of  which was 
1. a l l o c a t t e d  t o  1974, and 15% t o  1973; i n d u s t r i a l  output  in-  
creased i n  a l l  the sewers and the  genera l  index based on 1970 
ro se  from 123 t o  158; t h e  most oustanding growth appeared i n  
t h e  a r e a s  of machinery, e l e c t r i c a l  a r t i c l e s  and p l a s t i c s .  I n  
general ,  throughout these  years ,  t he  economy of  Ecuador began 
a process o f  e s s e n t i a l  t ransformation t o  achieve a sustained 
growth, A boom of t h i s  magnitude could n o t  go on i n d e f i n i t e l y  
and t he  economic pol icy  during t h e  next  year  t r i e d  t o  maintain 
t h e  economic l e v e l s  reached, 
C ,  Economic Trend Af te r  1974 
The production during 1975 grew, i n  cu r r en t  terms, a t  a r a t e  
of 18.1%. showing a remarkable drop i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  growth 
of the  immediately preceding years.  The g ros s  na t i ona l  product 
a t  cons tan t  p r i c e s  increased only 5,374, t h e  lowest growth i n  the  
l a s t  f i v e  years ,  The gross  na t iona l  product,  i n  turn ,  increased 
i n  8.0% i n  1975, namely, lower than t h e  13.1% of  1974, 
National savings during 1975 increased a t  a r a t e  of 23.4'/, Li 
cu r r en t  values,  and 7.7% i n  cons tan t  values.  I n  both cases 
a reduct ion  i s  shown wi th  regard  t o  t h e  r a t e s  of 71.3% and 9.@A 
respec t ive ly ,  recorded i n  1974 (Table 1-2) . The gross  build-up 
of c a p i t a l  continued i t s  upward trend,  r e f l e c t i n g  the sound 
degree of' c a p i t a l i z e t i o n  of the indust ry ,  The policy of incent ive :  
TABLE 1-2 
NATIOEAL SAVINGS, 1971 - 1975 
(mil l ion sucres) 
Current 
Values 
Percentage Constant Percentage 
Grawth ( %) - Values Growth ( %) 
Source : Ecuador Central Bank and estimates of  the Foundation for  Educa- 
t i o n  and Development, Ecuador. 
7!ABLE 1-3 
CAPITAL BUILD-UP, 1970-1975 
(mil l ion sucres) 
year 
Gross 
Current Constant 
N e t  
Current Con sta nt 
Source: Ecuador Central Bank and estimates of the Foundation for  Educa- 
t i o n  and Development, Ecuador. 
t o  the small industry  and handicrafts ,  the big industry, agricul-  
t u r a l  and l ivestock,  mining and t o u r i s t i c  sectors,  through the 
a. 
mechanism of financing funds, f a c i l i t a t e s  the  increase in  the gross 
build-up of capi ta l s ,  a t  a t h e  when there  were several  indications 
of an economic recession, In current  terms, the growth r a t e  of the 
gxoss-build up of  cap i t a l s  dropped from 55.5% i n  1974, to  42.7% i n  
1975, however, a t  constant pr ices  the r a t e  went up from 19.1% t o  
26.8% (see Table 1-3)-  The net  build-up, which considers the  de- 
preciation of investments, kept a high growth during the  year. In 
r e l a t ion  t o  the country's population, it may be s t a t ed  t h a t  the  gross 
build-up of c a p i t a l  per inhabitant  was Su/.4,646 (USS185) i n  1975, 
and Su/.3,367 (USS135) i n  1974, while the  ne t  c a p i t a l  build-up was 
~u/,3.004 (US$120) i n  1975, and Su/.1.887 (US$76) i n  1974, 
The total  consumption has shown a peraranent increase since 1970, 
maintaining the marginal t rend t o  consumption r e l a t i v e l y  s tab le  i n  
0.9, Hanever, the growth r a t e  of t h i s  var iable  was reduced i n  1975 
t o  the leve ls  ,of  1973 (Table 1-4)- This reduction may be interpreted 
as the  inab i l i ty  of the economic system t o  keep up with an  accelerat-  
ed growth due t o  the  abaence of new pr ice  increarses f o r  o i l ,  The 
consumption per inhabi tant  i n  1975 was US$ 436, which represents a 
r a i se  of 20% i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  1974, while a t  constant pr ices  the con- 
sumption increased only from Su/.5,342 i n  1974 t o  Su/,5.563 i n  1975, 
i , e ,  4%. 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION, 1970-1975 
(million sucres) 
Current Percentage Constant Percentage 
year Value s Grawth ( %) Value s Growth ( %) 
Source: central Bank and estimates of  the Foundation for Education and 
Development, Ecuador. 
TABLE V I  - 4 
EVOLUTION BY REGIONS OF TNE ECUADORIAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1973 - 1975 
(t- 
Exports Imports Balance 
1973 1974 1975 1973 1974 1975 1973 1974 1975 
Andean Group 
ALALC (excl  .Andean Group) 
Central American and 
Caribbean 
united States  
Remaining areas o f  America 
CEE 
Eastern Europe 
~emaining part o f  Europe 
Asia (excluding Japan) 
Japan 
Middle East 
A f r  ica 
~ c e a n i a  
Other Countries 
Source : MICEI,  S t a t i s t i c a l  Department. 
J 
57. 
F, Jnteqration 
Two leve ls  should be d i f fe rent ia ted  i n  Ecuador ' s par t ic ipa t ion  
i n  processes of economic integrat ion,  One i s  the Latin American 
& 
Association of Free Trade and another the Andean Subregional Pact, 
1, AIALC 
The economic re l a t ions  of Ecuador with the countries which 
make up the  ALALC, i n  s p i t e  of the course of t h i s  process 
of continental  integration,  show an increasing expansion 
which has stepped up in the  l a s t  thxee years (Table vI-11)- 
This expansion takes place both i n  the exports and imports, 
I n  the l a s t  three years posi t ive  balances i n  the commercial 
trade have a l s o  been evident, t h a t  should be a t t r ibu ted  t o  
o i l  exports,  The most outstanding exports have been t o  Chile 
and Peru - t h a t  i n  1975 amounted t o  US$ 132 million, of a t o t a l  
of US$ 180 mill ion f o r  t o t a l  exports t o  the zone, 
An analysis  of Ecuadorian foreign txade t o  the  ALALC areas 
observed from the  viewpoint of various countries, allows 
t o  draw same in te res t ing  conclusions, In the f i r s t  place, 
the  higher volumes of foreign trade a re  carr ied out  with 
countries of the  highest r e l a t ive  i n d u s t r i a l  development : 
chi le ,  ~ e r f i ,  ~olombia,  ~ r a z i l ,  Argentina and ~ e x i c o ,  i n  t h i s  
order, The bulk of exports t o  the above countries is basi-  
ca l ly  made up of raw materials ,  while the  imports carr ied out 
by Ecuador from the above areas  comprise especial ly  manufac- 
c 
t TABLE V I  - 11 
TRADE OF ECUADOR WITH THE ALALC COUNTRIES, 1965 - 1975 
(mill ion d o l l a r s )  
FOB CIF 
Exports Imports 
Rate of annual 
qrowth ( % ) 
year Value % Value % Balances Exports Imports 
Source : MICEI, S t a t i s t i c a l  Department. 
- 
tured products, I n  t h e  exports  f o r  1975, Chile and Peru 
head t h e  l ist ,  since, as already s ta ted ,  ou t  of t h e i r  US$132 
mil l ion i n  imports from Ecuador, about US$l10 comprise o i l .  
The main remaining export  products of Ecuador t o  the ALALC 
countries a r e  cocoa and i t s  preparations, banana, f i sh ing  
products and straw hats .  concerning the  imports, it i s  noted 
t h a t  i ts range i s  considerable broader than the  exports,  and 
the  main products comprise i n d u s t r i a l  elements and processed 
raw mater ia ls ,  mainly from Colombia, ch i l e  and ~ r a z i l .  
TRADE BALA 
- .  
Export ,  Import,  Balance : 
TOTAL 
AXDEAN GROUP 19;'148 43.184 -24,036 : 
Bol iv i a  9 5 6 89 
Colombia 7.157 28.236 -21.079 
Chile  6.522 4.606 1.916 1 
Peru 5.276 3.177 2.099 
Venezuela 98 7.159 -7.0G1 
TOTAL ALALC 25.439 50.472 -24.483 
( LAFTA ) 
Argentina 4.248 1.962 2.286 
B r a z i l  982 1.335 -353 
Mexico 1 .063 3.004 -1.941 
Paraguay 3 840 -837 
Uruguay 4 5 147 -102 
Source: MICEI, S t a t i s t i c a l  Department. 
2. The Andean Pact 
The analysis of tha ALALC embodies a lso  essent ia l  elements 
C 
of Ecuador's economic re la t ions  with the Andean Pact. Evi- 
dently the most dynamic group within the ALALC i s  represented 
by the Andean Pact, which contributes over 5CPA of the to ta l .  
I n  accordance with Table VI-4, the Pact has become the th i rd  
economic u n i t  i n  the order of importznce fo r  the Ecuadorizn 
foreign t rade i n  1975. The evolution of foreign trade with 
the Andean countries i s  shown i n  Tables VI-12 and VI-13. A 
drop is  noted i n  the growth r a t e  of exports for  1975, i n  sp i te  
of which a high level  of commercial exchange within the area is  
maintained, 
To the  extent t h a t  the Andean Pact i s  an agreement of economic 
integration; higher than the zone of free trade, a s  ALALC, a 
more thorough study of Ecuador's commercial exchange with the 
countries of the subregion would be t o  the point, The above 
mentioned trend for  the ALALC concerning the type of products 
exchanged, is  kept along similar l ines  fo r  the case of the 
Andean Agreement, while the products allocated i n  the various 
integration programs do not ye t  acquire importance i n  the 
economic re la t ions  with the Pact. ~eviewing t h i s  s i tuat ion 
i n  the l i gh t  of the crisis faced by the process since 1974, 
it must be concluded tha t  no grea t  drive may be expected i n  
I 
TABLE vI-13 
TRADE OF ECUADOR WITH THE ANDEAN GROUP COUNTRIES, 1965-1975 
c (million dol la rs )  
FOB CIF Rate of Annual 
Exports Imports Growth ( % ) 
value % Va lue % Ba la nee s Exports Imports 
e 
Source : MICEI, S t a t i s t i c a l  Department, 
- 
the exchange of programs a l loca t ted  according t o  the program, and 
t h a t  the commercial trend i n  the future, should it be maintained, 
would only affect the  exchange of t r ad i t i ona l  products, without 
achieving subsequently a more defined integration,  as the i n i t i a l  
expectations o f  the  Cartaqena Agreement allowed t o  assume. 
B, Behavior of t h e  external  sector  durinq the f i r s t  semester of 1976 
The trade balance of the f i r s t  s i x  months of 1976 shws  a favor- 
able balance of US$ 86.6 million. O f  this t o t a l ,  exports exceed 
over US$100 mil l ion the figure for the same period of the preceding 
year, and a r e  s l igh t ly  lower than those for  the second se- 
mester of 1975. Imports exceed over US$20 million those 
r, 
for  the f i r s t  semester of 1975, and a re  s l igh t ly  higher 
than imports for the second semester of l a s t  year (Table 
vI-14). 
1. Exports 
Table V I - 1 4  shows the evolution of exports d u r i n g  t h e  
f i r s t  s i x  months of 1976. O i l  exports increased s l ight ly  
during t h i s  period, which includes a price increase de- 
creed by the OPEP and abided by Ecuador, Banana has 
dropped s l igh t ly  i n  r e l a t ion  t o  the preceding year, cocoa 
has remained steady i n  re la t ion  t o  the poor year of 1975, 
while coffee has maintained the  boom of the previous year, 
TABLE VI-14 
ECUADORIAN FOREIGN TRADE 
DURING THE FIRST SEMESTER OF 1976 
Exports Imports Balance 
January 
February 
March 
April 
Ma Y 
June 
Total 
Source : ~cuado?  Central Bank. 
2.  Imports 
Imports during the  f i r s t  semester of 1976 have remained 
i more o r  less average i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  a c t i v i t y  during 
1975. This i s  then a t  a lower l e v e l  than i n  previous 
years and shows a c o n t r a s t  with the s i t u a t i o n  of i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  currencies  which have continued increas ing during 
these  f i r s t  s ix  months (Table N-1) , 
H. Conclusions 
The first conclusion t o  be drawn from this ana lys i s  i s  t h a t  
the o i l  boom has begun t o  decl ine ,  and the  fore ign sec to r  tends 
t o  a higher a t a b i l i t y  than t h e  p reva i l ing  one up t o  1972, w i t h -  
out  the  marked unbalance t h a t  character ized the  s ec to r  from 
way back. 
The end of - the first boom of  the o i l  exports w i l l  allow t he  
Ecuadorian economy, on sounder W S ~ S ,  to plan  mare r a t i o n a l  
fo recas t s  i n  t he  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  i ts eco&c resources, The drop 
i n  the level of  imports may prevent  an i n t e r n a l  expansion i n  the 
ecacmy, as could be expected due t o  the increas ing fore ign 
exchange obtained fram o i l .  This expamion should e spec i a l l y  
be o r i en t a t ed  t w a r d s  an  indue t r i a l i za t i on  process, t h e  success 
o r  f a i l u r e  of which can only be appraised i n  the medium term, 
Likewise, t h e  ro l e  of  t h e  Andean Pact  i n  promoting t h a t  i n t e r n a l  
economic expansion, can only be determined i n  the next few 
years, although i n  the l i g h t  o f  recent events the  eventual 
separation o f  Ecuador from the Group is foreseen. However, 
the trend to a new s i tuat ion  o f  balance w i l l  alluw a clearer 
and more appropriate a t t i tude  on the part of a l l  the national 
sectors i n  the economic management o f  the country. 
PERU -
4 
Genera l  Velasco took  o f f i c e  as P r e s i d e n t  o f  Peru i n  1968. H i s  
government se t  as main objective the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of Peruvian 
s o c i e t y  w i t h  the purpose of  hav ing  g r e a t e r  popu la r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  the b e n e f i t s  o f  p rog res s .  T h i s  purpose impl ied  t h e  change of 
t h e  peasants' s t a t u s ,  improvement of income d i s t r i b u t i o n  z n d  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of d e c i s i o n s  and economic p r o p e r t i e s  t o  marginated 
s o c i a l  groups.  
With t h a t  purpose ,  an  impor t an t  a g r a r i a n  r e fo rm was i n i t i a t e d ,  
mining and f i s h i n g  companies w e r e  n a t i o n a l i z e d ,  t h e  Labor Com- 
munity Law w a s  s i gned  t o  g r a n t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t o  t h e  workers i n  
t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and t h e  S o c i a l  P rope r ty  Law w a s  
- 
enac t ed  s e e k i n g  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  workers  i n  t h e  manage- 
ment of e n t e r p r i s e s .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s ,  some l a b o r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and f o r e i g n  t r a d e  problems 
f o r c e d  t h e  s t r a t e g y  t o  c o n f r o n t  g r e a t  f i s ca l  problems and caused 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  reserves t o  d imin i sh  r a p i d l y  i n  1975. On the o t h e r  
hand,  i n f l a t i o n  a c c e l e r a t e d  and many of  t h e  government ' s  e f f c r t s  
t o  improve p o p u l a r  w e l f a r e  d e c l i n e d  i n  view of  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
rises i n  p r i c e s .  
The main problems faced  by Peru have been the c o n t r a c t i o n  of 
domes t ic  s a v i n g s ,  a d rop  i n  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  p roduc t ive  s e c t o r s  
and a r e c e s s i o n  of p r i v a t e  investment .  Between 1970 and 1974 
t h e  g r o s s  i n t e r n a l  p roduc t  i n c r e a s e d  a t  an  annua l  rate of 5.5%: 
C 
g r o s s  inves tment ,  from 13% i n  1970 passed t o  be 16% of  the 1974 
produc t ,  c e n t e r i n g  mainly i n  the mining and o i l  s e c t o r s .  However, 
s i n c e  consumption inc reased  more r a p i d l y  t han  t h e  produc t  and 
g r e a t  l o s s e s  w e r e  s u f f e r e d  by p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  the n a t i o n a l  
s av ings  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  dropped f r o m  15% t o  11% of t h e  produc t  
between 1970 and 1974, t h u s  producing an i n t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e  gap  
which had t o  be covered by f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l .  T h i s  e x c e s s i v e  
growth of  a g g r e g a t e  demand r e f l e c t e d  i n  a r a p i d  a c c e l e r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  i n f l a t i o n  rate which went f r o m  a n  annua l  average 
of  7.2% between 1969 and 1973 t o  18% i n  1974, and i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  of the ba l ance  of  paymentsin c u r r e n t  account  from 
0.5% t o  6.2% of t h e  produc t  between 1972 and 1974. The re fo re ,  
Peru w a s  f o r c e d  t o  r e v e r t  t o  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t  a t  l ong  t e r m  a t  t h e  
same t i m e  t h a t  it exper ienced  a f a s t  e r o s i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e s e r v e s .  
S ince  1975, t h e  government adopted impor tan t  measures t o  s t a b i l i z e  
the economy. I n  January  of  t h a t  y e a r ,  it inc reased  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  
and c u t  s u b s i d i e s  t o  f o o d s t u f f s .  F i n a l l y ,  on September 26 it 
deva lua ted  i t s  cur rency  i n  14%. However, these measures w e r e  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o r r e c t  the  s i t u a t i o n .  On one p a r t ,  t h e  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of the in t e r change  t e r m s  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  e x p o r t s ,  
whi le  imports  cont inued  t o  i n c r e a s e ,  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, l a b o r  
C 
compl ica t ions  and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  f i s c a l  d e f i c i t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  
accelerate i n f l a t i o n ,  
I n  August 1975, t h e  new government of  General  Morales adopted 
measures t o  improve f i n a n c i a l  cond i t ions ,  I n  January  1976 t a x e s  
w e r e  r a i s e d  an6 a reduction of public expense wss &creed; sub= 
sequen t ly ,  some s u b s i d i e s  i n  t h e  mechanism of  p r i c e s  w e r e  reduced, 
and f i n a l l y ,  a new monetary deva lua t ion  w a s  decreed ,  more d r a s t i c  
t h a n  t h a t  o f  September 1975. 
Although t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  new government of  Peru a s  it relates 
t o  s o c i a l  m a t t e r s  cannot  be  d e f i n i t e l y  a s s e s s e d ,  and any op in ion  
the reon  i s  premature,  it should be noted t h a t  it seems, a t  l e a s t ,  
t o  have s topped t h e  p rocess  of  i nnova t ions  i n i t i a t e d  by General  
Velasco,  and t o  have s t a r t e d  a development s t r a t e g y  less i n t e r -  
v e n t i o n i s t  and w i t h  g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  
I n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  p o l i c i e s  of  a g r a r i a n  reform, t h e  new government 
has g iven  emphasis mainly t o  encourage product ion .  I n  t h e  speech 
of  May 31, 1976, where t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  "second phase of 
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n "  w a s  r a i s e d ,  P r e s i d e n t  Morales c r i t i c i z e d  s t r o n g l y  
t h e  schemes o f  s o c i a l  p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e i r  antagonism wi th  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and set g u i d e l i n e s  t o  announce t h e  h a l t  t o  t h e  
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  process .  Furthermore,  e f f o r t s  t o  improve t h e  
f inanc ia l  balance have been made, ser ious ly  a f fec ted  by a 
Gontinuous dependency on the c r e d i t s  from the  Central Bank to 
the  central  government and t o  the s t a t e ' s  enterprises ,  and by 
a dangerous increase of external  debts.  A l s o  importance has 
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been given to the movement of internal  resources to finance 
development plans.  
VENEZUELA 
A S  it is  wel l  known, by the  end of  1973 the world p r i c e s  of  o i l  
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had an  unprecedented increase.  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  p r i c e  of crude1 rose  
from US$ 3 -71 p e r  b a r r e l  i n  t he  average i n  1973 t o  US$10,53 i n  
1974 and US$ 11.00 i n  1975 (Table 1-1 and Graph 1-1). Venezuela, 
as o the r  oil-producing countr ies ,  obtained through t h i s  r a i s e  ap- 
p rec iab le  f inenc ia1  benef i t s ,  however, it had t o  face  new chall,enges 
and d i f f i c u l t i e s .  A s  shown i n  Table 1-2, the  value  of expor ts  of 
merchandise increased from US$ 4,601 mi l l i on  i n  1973 t o  US$11,109 
mi l l i on  i n  1974, t o  drop l a t e r  on t o  US$ 8,899 m i l l i o n  i n  1975. 
Thus, i n  a s h o r t  period, Venezuela was ab le  t o  increase  its ne t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  reserves  from US$ 2,474 rrrillion by t he  end of 1973 
t o  US$ 9,387 m i l l i o n  by t he  end of 1975, The revenues of  t he  
c e n t r a l  government, i n  tu rn ,  more than doubled up i n  1975 on account 
of t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  co l l e c t i on  of  taxes  and r o y a l t i e s  on hydrocarbons : 
cu r r en t  revenues amounted t o  US$ 4,294 mi l l i on  i n  1973 and went up 
t o  US$ 9,036 m i l l i o n  during 1975, f r o m  the  improved tenns of  ex- 
change. A l l  t hese  f i n a n c i a l  b e n e f i t s  were obtained i n  s p i t e  of the  
1 
There a r e  two s e r i e s  o f  o i l  p r i ce s .  The reference  p r i c e  app l i e s  
t o  t he  production value f o r  t he  pufpose of  tax est imates.  
The r e a l i z a t i o n  p r i c e s  a r e  t he  ones a c t u a l l y  paid.  The f igures  
r e f e r  t o  t h e  second one. Graph 1-1 a l s o  shows d e t a i l s  concern- 
ing  t h e  f i r s t  mentioned p r i ce s .  
drop i n  t he  average production volume of  o i l  of  3.37 mi l l i on  
b a r r e l s  per  day i n  1973 t o  2 -35 mi l l i on  i n  1975. 
I n  1974 an  important  s e r i e s  of econo~nic i n d i c a t o r s  show a change : 
o i l ,  i n  pe r cen tua l  terms of  t h e  gross na t i ona l  product,  increases  
from 29/ ,  t o  4PA; t h e  revenue o f  the c e n t r a l  government f i n d s  87'7 
of its sources in o i l  income ; o i l  covers more than 95% o f  the  
revenues i n  the balance o f  payments on expor t  of merchandise, 
Thereupon t h e  Government, as main c o l l e c t o r  of  o i l  proceeds, had 
t o  resolve  s e v e r a l  a spec t s  o f  economic pol icy  : should t h e  S t a t e  
channel t h e  new resources through d i r e c t  investment o r  leave  
t he  use of  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  the  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and channel t h e  re-  
sources through c r e d i t  funds? Should t he  c a p i t a l  be inves ted  i n  
t h e  Mproductive-" s e c t o r s  of goods and s e rv i ce s  ( ag r i cu l t u r e ,  in-  
dus t ry ,  t r a n s p o r t  and phys ica l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ) ,  o r  was i t  more 
adv i sab le  t o  use  the  sources of  income t o  r i s e  t h e  consumption 
l e v e l  of t h e  poores t  s o c i a l  groups? 
Aside from t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r o f i t s ,  t h e  Government faced i n  1974 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  and chal lenges a r i s i n g  from t h e  new s i t u a t i o n ,  
some r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  economic juncture and o t h e r s  from problems of 
s t r u c t u r e  and development. The f i r s t  cons idera t ion  was t o  avoid 
t h a t  such a l a r g e  and f a s t  inc rease  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  reserves 
turned i n t o  expansion of t h e  currency and consequently should r e f l e c t  
in f la t ionary  pressures.  TO prevent the monetary impact, the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund was created i n  June 1974, which in- 
C 
vested a p a r t  of  t he  reserves i n  s e c u r i t i e s  of the in te rna t iona l  
market of c a p i t a l s ,  ~ h u s  i n  1974 the  Investment Fund received 
WS$3,000 mi l l i on  and by the end of 1975 it had accrued wS$3,900 
mil l ion i n  i n t e rna t iona l  a s s e t s ,  a p a r t  from contr ibut ing some 
$500 rrlil1i.cn t o  the  f i r~anc ia t ion  of the fo re igc  elemer,t ~f kfi- 
por tan t  development projects .  If i n  1974 t h e  amount invested i n  
t h e  Fund had entered the  currency flow, the  means of payment 
would have increased over 213% i n  a sho r t  time, 
The second considerat ion of the  Government was t o  take the  ad- 
vantage of t h e  f inanc ia l  s i t u a t i o n  t o  speed up the  economic growth, 
d ivers i fy  t h e  economy, solve the  problems of cos t  s t ruc ture ,  and 
- 
improve the  l i v i n g  standard of the  poorest  groups through the  
ac t ion  of the S t a t e  i f  the soc i a l  f i e l d ,  In  other  words, the  
idea was t o  "saw the  o i l "  t o  ensure t h a t  the f r u i t s  of  a finan- 
c i a l  gain, probably t rans i to ry ,  were r e f l ec t ed  i n  ac tua l  and 
permanent prof i t s  through the  development of  the  non-oil economy, 
I n  the  previous t h i r t y  years, Venezuela had already accumulated 
an experience of development almost unique i n  La t in  America. 
I n  f ac t ,  by t h e  end of 1973, it had an i n s t a l l e d  capacity of s t e e l  
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TABLE 1-1 
AVERAGE VENEZUELAN OIL PRICES, 1970-1976 
t 
(US$ p e r  b a r r e l )  
A, ~ e a l i z a t i o n  P r i c e s  
crude O i l  1.76 2.25 2.43 3.56 10.40 11.03 11.1( 
~ e f i n e a  Products  2.00 2 "55 2.70 4.57 i1.19 11.58 1 1 . i 1  
Average 1.84 2.35 2.52 3.89 10.68 11.19 11.1 
B,  Reference P r i c e s  
Average 1.83 2.37 2.95 4.41 14.35 13.90 13.8 
Sources :   in is try o f  ~ i n e s  and Hydrocarbons, 
* Pre l iminary  p r o j e c t i o n ,  
and r o l l i n g  p l a t e s  product ion  o f  1.2 m i l l i o n  t o n s  p e r  y e a r  a t  
t h e  ~ i d e r d r g i c a  d e l  Orinoco, SIDOR; a product ion  capac i ty  of  
aluminum of some 124,000 t o n s  p e r  y e a r  i n  Aluminio de Canoria, 
ALCASA ; a p r i v i l e g e d  h y d r o e l e c t r i c a l  development wi th  a capac i ty  
of  2,300 MW; and a more ex tens ive  road network than  many o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  the con t inen t ,  Perhaps t o  fo l low a f a m i l i a r  l i n e ,  
t h e  Government decided t o  g ive  p r i o r i t y  t o  t h e  development of 
b a s i c  i n d u s t r i e s .  The Venezuelan Investment Fund had t o  f inance 
an important p a r t  of these p ro jec t s ;  s tud ies  were s t a r t e d  t o  
in%rease the output  of s t e e l  i n  Sidor t o  5 mil l ion tons per 
year; the p o s s i b i l i t y  was reviewed t o  enlarge the  aluminum 
production t o  400,000 tons per year and the generating capacity 
of the ~ u r i  t o  3,500 MW: and other pro jec ts  were leunched f o r  
reforesta t ion o f  special  areas,  increase i n  the  cement produc- 
t i ve  c ~ p z c i t y ,  & k c ,  
N o  doubt a l l  of t h e  above pro jec ts  face problems for  t h e i r  execu- 
t ion ,  The t ranspor ta t ion  of such a large volume of s t e e l ,  requires 
investments i n  t h e  development of the ra i l road  network, the capa- 
c i t y  of seaports ,  warehouses and other aspects r e l a t ed  t o  the  dis-  
t r ibu t ion  and s a l e  of products, Likewise, the shortage of sk i l l ed  
labor is a n  important l imit ing factor ,  since a d e f i c i t  of 13,000 
sk i l l ed  laborers  i s  foreseen every year during the  next f ive  years, 
which should be f i l l e d  e i t h e r  with migrations o r  with accelerated 
t ra in ing  of Venezuelan personnel, In  short ,  the  development of 
Venezuela faces problems of organization and management, since 
a subs tan t ia l  share  of the resources a re  t o  be chznnelled through 
autonomous en terpr i ses  of the  State ,  which have t o  be coordinated, 
supervised and cont ro l  t o  ensure coherence i n  ac t ion  and avoid 
bottlenecks i n  the execution of the projects  car r ied  out by each 
one of them. 
A s  f a r  a s  s o c i a l  problems a r e  concerned, it should be pointed o u t  
t&at Venezuela has  t h e  h ighes t  p e r  cap i t a  income i n  La t in  America 
(US$ 1,970 i n  1974, according to the World Eank methodology), 
b u t  a t  t h e  same time, over 4W'/, of t h e  po lu l a t i on  rece ive  a n  in-  
come under US$ 250, On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  educat ional  and h e a l t h  
systems have s e r i o u s  shortcomings, s ince  t h e i r  access  i s  l imi ted  
and t h e i r  s e r v i c e  def  icicnt . klthuucjh the  unen-,ployr;ent r a t e  i s  
low (6,5%), t h e  d isguised  unemployment and subemployment inc rease  
t o  15% t h e  p a r t  of t h e  l abo r  force  not  used o r  poorly used. ~ i n a l -  
ly ,  with t h e  country ' s inc reas ing  revenues, t h e  expecta t ions  of 
t h e  marginal popula t ion  have a l s o  r a i s ed ,  and t h e  Government's a c t i o n  
i s  imperative t o  ease  t h e i r  f r u s t r a t i o n s .  I n  view o f  the  above, 
spec i a l  a t t e n t i o n  was given t o  programs of personnel  t r a i n i n g ,  
- 
n u t r i t i o n  and hea l t h ,  Also, when the  o i l  revenues began r a i s i n g  
i n  1974, t h e  Government decreed a s a l a ry  increase  between 5% and 
2 5% and f ixed  minimum wages o f  US$ 3.50 p e r  day ( B s ,  15-00 p e r  day) 
i n  order  t h a t  a share  of t he  ga ins  could be r e f l e c t e d  i n  h ighes t  
l e v e l s  of consumption and s o c i a l  wel fare ,  
~ u r i n g  the  f i r s t  yea r s  of  p r e s iden t  ~ Q r e z  Administrat ion,  Venezuela 
granted important  c r e d i t s ,  both  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  
(World Bank US$ SO0 mi l l ion ,  ~ n t e r a m e r i c a n  Bank of Development 
US$500 mi l l ion ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund US$700 mi l l i on ) ,  and t o  
some Lat in  American count r ies ,  Paradoxically,  i n  1976 t h e  GO- 
vernment obtained au thor iza t ions  from the National Congress t o  
I. 
obta in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loans f o r  US$5,000 mi l l ion ,  Thus t he  coun- 
t r y  who i s  a lender,  appears and prospect ive borrower, Apparent- 
ly ,  t he  conserva t ion i s t  pol icy  of o i l  and the  magnitude o f  t h e  
programs of pub l i c  investment, explain t h i s  change. 
I n  1973 the  entrance of Venezuela t o  the  Andean Group represent-  
ed a n  important change i n  t h e i r  development programs, The Andean 
Group opens u p  t o  Venezuela oppor tun i t i es  t o  improve the  market 
o f  some of its i n d u s t r i a l  products,  e spec i a l l y  those r e l a t ed  t o  
in tens ive  manufacturing products, and t o  spread o u t  i t s  c a p i t a l  
i n  severa l  count r ies  of the  subregion, However, t h e  commitments 
fixed t o  Venezuela - a r e  not  easy t o  f u l f i l l  inasmuch a s  t h e  Customs 
pro tec t ion  is a n  e s s e n t i a l  element t o  secure h igh p r o f i t  l eve l s .  
TABLE 1-2 
EFFECT OF OIL PRICE INCREASE 
c (mi l l ion  d o l l a r s )  
Project 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
r Export of merchandise Export of o i l  Increase (+) o r  decrease (-) of t h e  o i l  expor t s  O i l  expor ts  as percentage cf t he  t o t 8 1  [ 7:)- 
Current revenues of the 
Central  government 
O i l  revenues 
Increase (+) o r  decrease 
(-) of t h e  o i l  revenue 
o i l  revenues as percentage 
of t h e  total ( %) 
Gross National  Product 
a t  p r i ce s  11.533 12.970 14.179 17.368 26.345 27.917 31.000 
o i l  product 2.031 2.840 2.920 4.387 10.717 8.538 7.888 
O i l  product as percentage 
of t he  t o t a l  ( %) 18 22 2 1 2 5 4 1 3 1 25 
Net i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e se rves  
(end per iod)  1.025 1.532 1.868 2.474 6.829 9.387 8.415 
Increase (+) o r  decrease 
(- 1 - 507 336 606 4.355 2.558 -868 
ce : Venezuela Centra l  Rank and es t imates  of  FEDESARROLLO, 
t o  June 1976. 
LIST OF THE 103 DECISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION 
Decision No. 1, The Agreement of  subregional  I n t eg ra t i on  i s  de- 
s igneted Cartagena Agreement. 
~ e c i s i o n  No, 2. The Commission de lega tes  some of  i t s  f a c u l t i e s  
on t he  Board, 
Decision No. 3 .  ~ p p o i n t i n g  Members of t he  Board, 
Decision No. 4. Es tab l i sh ing  t he  contxibut ion of  t he  Mefiber Coun- 
tries t o  the  Board's Annual Budget, 
Decision No. 5, Approving t he  budget of the Board's exerc i se  f o r  1970. 
Decision No. 6. Approving the regu la t ions  of t he  Commission of t he  
Cartagena Agreement (See Decision No. 14) . 
Decision No.. 7. Coordinating by t he  Board of Government meetings. 
Decision No, 8, Coordination of t h e  Member Countries,  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  the  Complementary Agreements of t h e  ALALC. 
Decision No. 9. ~ e g u l a t i o n  of the  Board. 
Decision No. 10. P a r t i c i p a t i o n  of Ecuador i n  the  Complementary Agree- 
ment No. 6 regarding the  petrochemical indust ry .  
Decision No. 11. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  observers i n  t h e  meetings of the 
Commission (See Decisions 13, 21, 35 and 4.2). 
~ e c i s i o n  No, 12. Approval of the  Common ~ in imum External  Tar i f f  f o r  
the  products of t h e  f i r s t  s ec t i on  of t he  Common L i s t .  (See Decisions 
30, 33 and 64) .  
Decision No, 13. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of Venezuela i n  t h e  meetings regarding 
the Subregional I n t eg ra t i on  process (See Decisions 11, 2 1 ,  35 and 4 2 ) .  
Decision No. 14. Amendments t o  A r t i c l e  32 of  Decision No. 6. (See De- 
c i s i on  No. 6 ) .  
Decision No. 15. Approval of  t he  i n i t i a l  t a x  r e l ea se  points .  
Decision No. 16. L i s t  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and l i ve s tock  products f o r  
purposes of  t he  app l i ca t i on  of A r t i c l e s  72, 73 and 99 of the Agree- 
ment (See Decisions 43 and 66) .  
Decis ion  No.  17. Regulat ion of  t h e  Economic and S o c i a l  Advisory 
committee. (See Dec i s ions  17a and 55) .  
C 
Decis ion  No. 17a.   mending some a r t i c l e s  of Decis ion No. 17. (See 
Decis ions  1 7  and 55).  
Dec is ion  NO. 18. programming o f  t h e  pe t rochemica l  i ndus t ry .  
Dec is ion  No. 19.  Regula t ions  o f  t h e  Consul t ing  Committee. 
~ e c i s i o n  No. 20. ~ u d g e t  f o r  1971. 
Decisior!  52 ,  2i, ? a r t i c i p z t i . c n  of Venezuela in t h e  meetinas ccx-  
ce rn ing  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  sub reg iona l  i n t e g r a t i o n .  (see ~ e c i s i o n s  
I I . 8  13, 35, 42 a n d  70). 
Dec is ion  No. 22, Mechanisms and procedures  f o r  adjustment  of po- 
l i c i e s  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  development p l a n s  o f  t h e  Member Coun t r i e s  
(See Decis ions  36, 39, 53 and 68 ) .  
Dec is ion  No. 23. I n i t i a l  tax r e l e a s e  p o i n t  expressed  i n  NABALALC 
terms (See Dec i s ion  No. 6 4 ) .  
Dec is ion  No. 24. Common regime of  t r ea tmen t  t o  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l s  
and cover ing also t rademarks ,  p a t e n t s ,  l i c e n s e s  and r o y a l t i e s .  (see 
Decis ions  Nos. 37,  37a, 46 and 48 ) .  
Dec is ion  No. 25, L i s t  o f  p roduc t s  s e t  a s i d e  f o r  s e c t o r i a l  programs 
o f  i n d u s t r i a l  development. (See Decis ions  26,  27, 28, 38, 51  and 59). 
Dec is ion  No. 26. L i s t  of p roduc t s  which a r e  n o t  produced i n  any coun- 
t r y  i n  t h e  Subregion and which have no t  been s e t  a s i d e  f o r  s e c t o r i a l  
programs o f  i n d u s t r i a l  development. ( see  Decis ions  25, 27, 28  and 38). 
Dec is ion  No. 27. L i s t  o f  p r o d u c t s  n o t  i nc luded  i n  a r t i c l e s  47, 49 
and 50 of t h e  Agreement (See Decis ions  25, 26, 2 8  and 3 8 ) -  
Decis ion  No. 28. L i s t  of  i t ems  n o t  produced i n  any country o f  t h e  
Subregion, which have n o t  been s e t  a s i d e  f o r  s e c t o r i a l  programs of 
i n d u s t r i a l  development, r e se rved  f o r  p roduc t ion  i n  B o l i v i a  and 
Ecuador (See Dec i s ions  25, 26, 2 7  and 38) .  
Dec is ion  NO. 29, L i s t  o f  p roduc t s  t h a t  w i l l  be l i b e r a t e d  i n  favor  
of  ~ o l i v i a  and Ecuador on January 1, 1971. 
Dec is ion  No. 30. Common ~ i n i m u m  Ex te rna l  T a r i f f  ( s ee  ~ e c i s i o n s  1 2 ,  
12, 33 and 64) .  
Decision No, 31, prepara t ion  of t h e  NABANDINA, (See Decisions 
5 1  and 58). 
Decision No, 32, Petrochemical industry.  
Decision No, 33, Common ~inirnum External  Ta r i f f ,  f u l f i l lmen t  
of the  p rov i s ions  of  A r t i c l e  2 of Decision No, 30 of the  Commi- 
ss ion ,  (See Decisions 12, 30, 6 4 ) -  
Decision No, 34. p r e f e r e n t i a l  margins f o r  ~ o l i v i a  and Ecuador. 
(See ~ e c i s i o n  65) . 
Decision No. 35, Creation of a Work Team made up b y  representa-  
t i v e s  of t he  Merriber Countries and Venezuela, (See Decisions 11, 13, 
21,  42 and 70) . 
Decision No, 36. Creat ion of the Tourism Council. (See Decisions 
22, 39, 53 and 68). 
Decision No, 37, Adjustments t o  the common regime of t reatment  
of fo re ign  c a p i t a l s  and concerning trademarks, pa ten t s ,  l i censes  
and r o y a l t i e s ,  (See Decisions 24 and 37a,) 
Decision No, 37a, Adding a paragraph t o  Decision No, 37. (See De- 
c i s i o n s  24 and - 37).  
Decision No,  38, Adjustment i n  Appendix t o  Decision No ,  2 7, (See 
Decisions 25, 26, 27 and 28) .  
Decision No,  39, Creat ion of t h e  Council of s o c i a l  Af f a i r s ,  (See 
Decisions 22, 36, 53 and 68) , 
Decision No, 40, Approval of the  Agreement t o  avoid double taxing 
between t h e  Member Countries and of the  Type Agreement, f o r  t h e  ce- 
l e b r a t i o n  o f  Agreements concerning double t ax ing  among t h e  Member 
Countries and o t h e r  S t a t e s  ou t s ide  t he  Subregion, 
Decision No. 41. Adjustments t o  t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  program. 
Decision No, 42, Incorporat ion of Venezuela t o  the Cartagena Agree- 
ment. (See Decisions 11, 13, 21, 35 and 70).  
Decision No, 43. ~ i r s t  measures t o  increase  the  t r ade  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
and l ives tock  products ,  (See Decisions 16 and 66) .  
Decision No, 44, Budget f o r  1972. 
Decision No. 45. ~ e g u l a t i o n s  t o  avoid or co r rec t  the  prac t ices  
t h a t  may d i s t o r t  the  competition within the Subregion, 
Decision No. 46. Standard regime of mult inational  corporations 
And regulat ion of the  treatment appli-cable t o  the  subregional 
c a p i t a l  (See Decisions 24, 37, 37a, 47 and 48). 
Decision No. 47. ~inimum percentage of pa r t i c ipa t ion  of  the  S ta te  
o r  companies in the S ta te  i n  mixed c a p i t a l  en te rpr i ses  (See De- 
c i s ions  24, 37, 37a, 46 and 48).  
Decision No, 48, ~ e g u l a  t i ons  applicable t o  the investments made 
by the  Andean Development Corporation i n  any of the  Member Coun- 
t r i e s  (See Declsiafis 2 4 ,  3 7 ,  37a, 46 and 47) .  
Decision No. 49. ~ u l i n g s  fo r  t he  adjustment of l eg i s l a t ions  con- 
cerning i n d u s t r i a l  promotion (See Decision No, 49a). 
Decision No. 50, Temporary in te rna t ion  of p r iva t e  vehicles (See 
Decision 69). 
Decision No. 51. Approval of NABANDIN24 (See Decisions 31 and 58). 
Decision No, 53. Amendment of Ar t i c l e  5 of Decision No. 22.  (See 
Decisions 2 2 ,  36, 39 and 68). 
Decision No. 54. Cost reduction of t ranspor t  a f f ec t ing  ~ o l i v i a .  
- 
Decision No, 55, Amending the  Regulations of the CAES, (See De- 
c i s ions  17 and 17a) .  
Decision No, 56, ~ n t e r n a t i o n a l  road t ranspor t ,  
Decision No. 57. Sec to r i a l  Program of I n d u s t r i a l  Development of 
the  M etalmechanic sector.  (See Decision No. 57a.). 
Decision No. 57a. Amendments t o  Decision No, 57. (See Decision 57). 
Decision No. 58. Amendments t o  NABANDINA, (See Decisions 31 and 51). 
Decision No. 59. L i s t  of Products s e t  as ide  f o r  Sec tor ia l  Programs 
of Indus t r i a l  Development expressed i n  terms of l?ABANDINA, 
Decision No. 60, L i s t  of products not  manufactured i n  any country 
of  t he  Subregion which have not  been reserved f o r  Sec to r i a l  Pro- 
grams of I n d u s t r i a l  Development expressed i n  terms of NABAmINA , 
Decision No. 61, L i s t  of products  n o t  included i n  a r t i c l e  47, 
49 and 50 o f  t h e  Cartagena Agreement, expressed i n  terms of NA- 
BANDINA. (See Decision 64) . 
bec i s ion  No. 62,  L i s t  of i tems n o t  produced i n  any country of the  
Subregion, n o t  reserved f o r  S e c t o r i a l  Programs o f  I n d u s t r i a l  De- 
velopment, w h i c h  were set. a s ide  t o  .be produced i n  Bolivia  and 
Ecuador, expressed i n  terms of NABANDINA. 
~ e c i s i o n  No, 63, L i s t  of  products  l i b e r a t e d  i n  favor  of Bolivia  
and Ecuador, expressed i n  terms o f  raABANDINA. 
Decision No. 64. Program of  ~ i b e r a t i o n  and Comnon ~ in imwn  Ex- 
t e r n a l  17az5fr '  for the products covered 537 Decision N o .  61. ( S e e  
Decisions 12, 23, 30, 33 and 61) .  
Decision No, 6 5 .  p r e f e r e n t i a l  margins f o r  Bolivia  and Ecuador, 
expressed i n  terms of  the  NABANDINA. (See Decisions 34, 4 1  and 51) .  
Decision No, 66. L i s t  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  and l i ve s tock  products  f o r  
t h e  purposes of app l i c a t i on  of a r t i c l e s  72, 73 and 99 of t he  
Agreement, expressed i n  terms of NABANDINA, (See ~ e c j - s i o n s  16 and 
43) P 
Decision No. 67,  ~ p p o i n t i n g  Members o f  t h e  Eioard. 
Decision No. 68, Creat ion o f  t h e  Health Council (See Decisions 
22, 36, 39 and 53). 
Decision No, 69, ~ e g u l a t i o n  of t he  regime of temporary in te rna -  
t i o n  of p r i v a t e  veh i c l e s  (See Decision 50) -  
Decision No. 7 0 ,  Conditions f o r  t h e  adherence o f  Venezuela t o  
t h e  Agreement. (See Decisions 11, 13, 21, 35 and 42).  
Decision No. 71, Creat ion of the  Council o f  Phys ica l  In tegra t ion .  
Decision No, 72, Amendment o f  the  Regulations of CAES, 
Decision No. 73, Budget f o r  the  Board f o r  1974, 
Decision No. 74, Amendment of  the Regulations of CAES, 
Decision NO. 75, C l a r i f i e s  t he  scope of i tem 90.16.01.02. o f  
XABANDINA . 
Decision No. 76, Creation of the  Agricul tural  and Livestock 
Council, 
Decision No, 77, ~mendments t o  the  NABANDINA, 
Decision No, 78, S ta r t ing  point  of Venezuela, PPV t o  f u l f i l l  
the Liberation Program, 
Decision No. 79, Amendments t o  ~ e c i s i o n  64. 
Decision No, 80, L i s t  of ag r i cu l tu ra l  and l ivestock products fo r  
purposes of the  appl icat ion of a r t i c l e s  72, 73 and 99 of the 
Agreement expressed i n  terms of NAR9NDIW4, 
Decision No, 81. Amendments t o  the  Common ~inimum External Tar i f f ,  
Decision No, €32. Financiations of the Andean Trade, 
Decision No. 83. Regulations on items not produced, 
Decision No, 84.   as is f o r  a subregional technological policy. 
Decision No. 85. ~ e g u l a t i o n s  for  the  appl icat ion of provisions 
on indus t r i a l  property, 
Decision No. 86, Projects  of technological development i n  the  
a r e  of copper rnetalurgy. 
Decision No. 87, Andean p ro jec t s  of technological development 
i n  the  area of copper hydrometalurgy. 
Decision No, 88, Increase of  1974 budget. 
Decision No. 89. Andean p ro jec t s  of technological development i n  
the area of t r o p i c a l  f o r e s t  resources. 
Decision No. 90. Budget fo r  the  Board f o r  1975. 
Decision No. 91, Sec tor ia l  Program of the  Petrochemical Industry, 
Decision No. 92. Agricul tural  and ~ i v e s t o c k  san i ta t ion .  
Decision No, 93, Agricul tural  and Livestock Commercialization. 
Decision No. 94. Andean road network system. 
Decision No, 95. ~ u d g e t  of t h e  Board fo r  1976. 
~ e c i s i o n  No, 96, ~ e s i g n a t i o n  of the  Members of the Board. 
Decision No, 97, ~ u t h o r i z a t  ion of the chilean Wvernm nt .  
6. 
Decision No, 98, Special Program of support t o  ~ o l i v i a ,  
Decision No, 99, Procedures for  the  consideration of the 
proposals of i n d u s t r i a l  deve lopment , 
~ e c i s i o n  No, 100. ~ecommendation t o  sign the Additional Protocol 
t o  the Cartagena Agreement, 
Dec is ion  KO, 103.. S ~ e c i a l  t r e a t ~ e ~ t  t o  ~ o l i v f a .  zr; a r n e d i t e r r s ? ~ ~ ?  
country, 
Docision b!o. 102. Agreement derived, r igh ts  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  csese  
f o r  Chile. 
Decision No. 103. Reforms t o  t h e  common t r e a t m e n t  to foreign cagi- 
t a l  (decision 24)  and a b o u t  marks, p a t e n t s ,  li- 
censes and royalt ies.  
Up t o  dic. 6 /76 , seven more decisions (until Vo, 110 ) h a v e  
been approved. 
- 
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CHILE 
756.945 
10.253.000 
80.5 
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898.805 
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10.214.0 
5.220.0 
8.861 .O 
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4.28 
4.28 
10.4 
25.4 
$311' u'UAT0ON 
BOLdIVIA 
2 Te~ritorial extension (Km ) 
f o l a i ~ o i ~ ~ ~ 5  
& i & G o f  n populotion 
Annual rate of d e d  
Averoge 1970-75 
Gross internal product in 1975 
(millions of dollars of 19702 1973) 
Gross internal product per copita 
(millions of dollars of 19702 1973) 
&KEf growth rater (percentage) 
GIP - t o b l  in  1960-75 
GIP per capita in 1960-75 
GIP - total in  1975 
Gross comei t ion  of capital in 1Y/4 
(millions of do1 lars of 1973) 
ore ign tra e in  
Exports 
Imports 
Internotional reserves (millions of dollars): 
December 1975 
External public debt (millions of dollors): 
December 1974 - 1975' 
Rate of exchange (units of notional currency for each 
dollar): 
December 1974 
December 1975 
Rise in the cost of l iving in 1975 (percentage) -
Tributary income of the centrol gowrnrnent 
Jpercentage of GIP) 
Percentage of total expenditures of the notional 
government for: 
Education 
J 
Health 
Hwsing 
Birth rate p s e  thousand inhabitants 
General deoth rate per one thousand inhobitants 
P E R U  
1.280.219 
15.615 .OW 
63.5 
3.0 
7.792.3 
493.0 
5.5 
2.9 
4 .O 
1.686.3 
1.378.0 
1.990.0 
509.3 
3.013.0 
38.70 
45 .OO 
24.0 
13.1 
- - 
1.090.581 
5 .633m- 
30.9 
2.7 
1,565.2 
270.0 
5.4 
2.8 
6 .O - 
273.4 
443.2 
502.0 
25.9 
9.8 
1.2 
45 .  0 
.- 1 6 . 0 1  A 
$5.1 
- 
! 54.6 66.4 62.6 
ch i ld  mortality per one thousand born alive 
19.4 
4.8 
1.1 
43.6 
; r3.7 
1.138.338 
23.415.800 
66.8 
2.7 
10.825.6 
462.0 
5.4 
2.4 
3.8 
2.508.2 - 
1.442.6 
1.502.6 
19.5 
7.4 
0.8 
34.2 
9.4 
270.670 
6.690.000 
42 .O 
2.9 
4.255.02 
636.3' 
6.8 
3.6 
8.0 
588.8 
885.0 
943.2 
156.2 285.6 
23.0 
7.2 
1 .o 
44.0 
10.8 
l c i ~ . O ~  93.8 
9.4 
3.2 
3.7 
37.3 
6.3 
Percentag of il l iteracy - 
095 .O - 
23.0 
20.0 
6.0 
12.7 
71.5 
13.8 
6.2 
6.5 
25.4 
7.4 
I 57.0 I I I 1 - 80.6 75.1 67.7 77.1 09.7 
60.6 Expected years of live at childbirth 
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33.09 
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25 .(I 
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13.2 
11.3 
IIATI ?I AMERICAN 1 NTE GlIATI  ON - ANDEAN GltOUIj 
. . .  
Formed by: 
1 - Count r i es  with 
rnq j or dcve lopment 
3 - Countries  w i t h  
minor rc la t ivc  
development 
They wcrc bcncf itcd by LAFTA due to: - grcatcr indust r ia l .  hasc - grcatcr favor clauses 
Xhcy were affccted hecar~sc  of having a minor 
dcvclopment and i n s u f f i c i e n t  marklets 
they f o r m  the Andean group w i t h i n  LAETA ' s f mmework, 
acccleratc thc devcloprncnt proclcss and they 
( ~ o l i v i o  -. . . -   . .. ... - . . . . ., - - .  . ,./ give prefcrcnkial' t rca tmcnt  to tllosc w i t h  minor 
! :.:cuador i ,.z-.-.:...-,-.--.=:7.-/ rclativc! development, thus: 
I Paraguay - Advantages in sec tor ia l  programs of i n d u s t r i a l  
devclopmenk (PSDI n) - ~ r c a t c k  ,terms i n  t a r i f f  tax rf lf asc - Exclu.sivcncss in certain inc lus tx ics  - Primacy in CAF ' 3  loans 
Nore effective mech~anir;:nr; wcre esl:.ablishcd t o  
encourage t rade and i n d u s t r y .  
- 
"Latin American F 'ee  Trade Association (ALL?J,C) 
IMPLICIT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT 
- Complementary among countries - For foir development of a l l  
- Distribution of benefits among member countries - Protectionist model of industrialization, based on: 
1.1 Substitution of imports 
- emphasis on boric manufactures 
- with scale economies, profitctble under extended markets conditions 
for subregional demand and external conip~tence. 
1.2 Requires active participation from: 
1.2.1 State: - .  -- Planning and carrying out sectorial develobment plans 
- Long term and high risk investments required by &sic 
industry 
- Procurement of internal saving 
1.2.2 Foreign direct investment: - Technological contributions - "Risk Capital" contribution 
1.3 Common and restrictive treatment to foreign capitel and to the transfer 
of technolow 
- So that foreign Investment would not mor,opalize benefits produced 
by industrlol protection. 
INSTRUMEMS OF THE AGREEMENT 
1. O f  Institutional Nohre 
* .  
1 .1 Commission: k x l m  legislative agency - one representative for &ch c m h y  
1.2 =: Technical agency - three members of the subregion 
1.3 Consultant Committee: contact with the member countries 
2.1 Andean Development Corporation - CAF 
- financial agency: 
financing 
technical assistance 
procurement of internal and external resources 
cooperation in  the study and carrying out of multinational projects 
its investments are considered as natioml 
2.2 Advisory Committee: economic and social - CAES - representatives, contmcton 
and woikers 
2.3 "Hipolito Unanue" agreement for public health and sanitation (signed i n  1976) 
2.4 "Andres Bello" agreement for educational cultural and technological lntegmtlon 
2.5 Specialized advisory councils: (fiscal policy, agriculture, &.) 
3. Of Legal-Economic Notun (see Charts) 
3.1 Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development - PSDl 
3.2 Program of tariff release 
. 3.3 Common foreign custom tariff (AEC) 
3.4 Compatibi lization of policies: 
3.4.1 Foreign investment (Statute of Capitals - Decision 24) 
3.4.2 Multinatioml enterprises and subregional capitol 
I 3.4.3 Treatment of CAF investments and of enterprises in  which the state participoks 
3.4.4 Adiustment of Industrial development legislations: ' 
- Custom tariff, fiscal, exchange, monetrrry and financial policies 
3.4.5 Technological policy 
3.4.6 Industrial policy 
.I 3.4.7 Tax and fiscal polley 
3.4.8 Commercial competl tion 
3.1 SECTORIAL PROGRAMMING OF INDUSTRIAL 
3 1 DEVELOPMENT - PSDI 
SEEKS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
I 
Programmed Sectors: . * 
PROBLEMS 
1 .  To take advantage of opportunities generated by 
extended markets 
1.  Inherent to the programming mechanism 1 Element that seeked a true economic integration a. Negative experiences of LAFTA's product to product 
negotiations, which the Cartagena 4greqment which 
hod been attempted to oyercome have been repeated 
the process of assignment of plants within sectorial 
programs. 
b. The existence of some productions i n  the subregion 
compels the countries to refuse to close existing 
plants. 
- Metol mechanical 
and that exceeds thesis of common market. 2. To diversify pl.oduction 
- Petrochemical 
3. To define a r e a  of specialization 
I t  requires development of the industry as o 
whole and i n  a complementary manner. 
Sectors under Negotiation: 
4. Maximum ut i l izat ion of available resources: with 
extended mrkets, activit ies may be programmed 
to provide independence to the Andean Group. 
- Automotive 
- Fert i l izen c. The assignment of plants under complementary agree-. 
ment No. 6 of LAFTA regarding pet,rochemistry,had 
to  be respected, allowing a greater margin of incf- 
f iciency. This agreement d id  not include Ecuador. 
5. To ut i l ize technologies i n  scale economies. 
CONTENTS OF EVERY PSDI: 
d. In the case of petrochemistry, every country wonted - Exact deter~i~inat ion of the products that i t  w i l l  
contain 
to have a petrochemical industry, which amounted , 
to  a 60% of inefficiency. 
e. The interests of tmnsnational industries hinder negotio- 
. tions -- such i s  the case of the outomotive industry. 
- 'Definition oi  plant's Iocation 
- Scheme of investments a t  subregional scale and 
measures to insure financing 2. Problems presented i n  the integration process 
a. Changes i n  the conceptions of industry development, 
mainly on the part of Colombia and Chile. 
- Scheme of l iberotion for trade among countries 
b. As a consequence of Decision. 100, the countries a n  
aliowed to remain out of the principle of industrial 
progmmming, through the non-participation i n  the 
PSDl's. Industrial programming based on four covn- . 
- Definition of !he common foreign custom tariff(AEC) 
which represents cost of inefficiency to be 
by the countrres 
tries was accepted. This means a regressive step to 
what LAFTA used to be, since I n  practice i t  is a 
- Establishment of terms within which the above 
commitments ore i n  force. 
return to the philosophy of c o n p l e m e n ~ i ~ n  . 
programs. 
3.2 PROGRAM OF CUSTOMS TARIFF SEEKS 
RELEASE 
Tlmt ~ l t c  liberation be: 
I t  I s  the maln objective of the Andean Group 
1 .  Tobl: that customs torlffs mocli zero 
because I t  I e  the way to obbln an extended 
-
2, Unlvcrsal; thot I t  covers a l l  praducts 
market, a fact whlch i s  posrlble I f  a free 
3. Gradual: No country can liberate sud- 
movament of produch exists among member Jonly. Time should be given to tho 
enterprises to improve their efficiency 
countries. level. 
4. Automatic: to prevent thot the inte- 
gmtion process be subject to nego- 
tlate product to product as i t  hap 
pened with LAFTA ond whlch had a 
exceedingly slow process. The autc- 
matlc libemtion implies that i t  Ir  not 
subject to negotiations. 
HOW THE TAX RELEASE OPERATES 
What w a s  done I n  the L lbmt lon Program? The rb r l l ng  point I s   he lower tax I n  the 
Flrst of all, Dollvlo and Ecuador. were dlffemntlated 
from the remalnlng countrles, gfvlng them preferential 
trootntont. 
Peru-Colombia-Venezue- Balivia-Ecuador 
la 
Various syslems were es- 
tablished: 
1. List of liberated or- 1. The same s i twt lon 
ticles by LAFTA (1st. 
group of the common 
list). These articles 
were libcmted further 
to the cart age^ 
Agreement's coming 
into effect. 
2. Immediate abolition of 
the system of non-tar- 
i f f  barriers (trode re- 
strictions other than 
thole of the custom 
tariff). Withe the ex- 
ception of orticles sub- 
ject to programming. 
3. Articles that the Andean 3. The same situation, 
Group wanted to assign although they ore fo- 
to programming shall be vorec i n  industrial 
left to b asslgned or progmmming. 
part thereof. 
4. Articles not produced In  the ~ b m g i 6 n  a n  dl- 
vided into two categories: 
custom b r i f f  of eoch product. Thls tax i s  
what l c  known as tux release inlt lal  point - 
' , 
PID. i t  may not exceed 100% ad valotkn over 
the CIF volue of the imporh. From the PID 
the tax should be reduced 10% annually until 
the total liberation i s  reached I n  1980. 
AMENDMENT (Llmo Protocol : Declslon 100 - Article 8) 
"The remaining taxes after the mduction of 
Decembr 31, 1975, shall + eliminated by 
means of six onnwl  and wccetllve nductiorn 
of 7% each, the f l n t  to be mads on Dh- 
cember 31, 1976 and the last, of 8%, to be 
ma& on becamber 31, 1982". 
b) the remaining prod- A~a) articlpr that are 
ucts are liberated reserved to there 
immediotely and m y  countries. 
'be produced by any 
country. 
5. List of cxccption: eoch 5. They enjoy special ad- 
country prepares a list vantages. In the case 
of products to be pro- of products originated 
tected to except them i n  these two countries, 
from the liberation pro- the norm of the list of 
gram. This list remaim excrptiom i s  not inflex- 
statiormry for same time ible. W k n  significant 
until m id  indortrier im- trade *xist between thest 
prove their efficiency. two countries and any 
mernbar country that 
makes exeeptims, this 
one opens its doors to im- 
porh from Ecuador or flollvla. 
6. The remaining produch, 6. A u h t l c  tax mlease 
that is those not con- i n  h ~ e  countries op- 
templated In  the above em)n In  different man- , , 
corer, whlch a n  the nor, 
malority, ore haas s u b  
est to automatic to% n- 
--.-- . - _ ... . . lease. . .. . _ _ . . - , _ ._ - - . . . . . . - - - - ,- .-- . - - . - . - - - -- - .- 
COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF - AEC 
For imports coming from countries outside the 
subregion. 
Definition criteriafor pmtecting regional 
industry - generation of employment , 
- technological contribution 
PREVIOUS STAGE TO AEC 
To set a minirnum common external tariff - AEMC - basic toriffs for 
imports corning from outside the subregion. Its pursose is :  . .  
a. To estalili,h an adequate protection to the subregional industry and 
to encourage its efficiency. 
b. To create progressively a margin of subregional preference. 
c. To faci l i~ate the adoption of the AEC. 
. 
It  was establiiiled that: - characteristics of the inciplent industry - December 31, 1975 would be the term for the full application of the 
AEMC. - After December 31, 1971 the member countries with tariffs applicable 
to imports from outside the subregion, lower to those of the AEMC, would 
be moved riear i t  i n  on onnual, lineal and automotic way up to the date 
indicated. 
- Countries with tax leyels (effective on May 26, 1969) higher than those 
established in the minimum common tariff, could not apply,to imports 
from third countries, levels lower than those approved i n  the AEMC. - After 1975 the AEC is approved and its application should stort imme- 
diately until i t  reaches complete functioning i n  1980. 
AMENDMENTS 
! \ 
They take place due to change i n  the conception of development 
of the countries. 
These amendments, occording to Decision 100, are the following: 
a. In the term - the approval of the AEC was extended two' 
years, that is, up to December 31, 1977, to put i t  into 
effect i n  1982. 
b. The AEC i s  changed to a "Customs tariff bmket" which establishes 
a 
a maximum and a 'minimum to be fixed at the moment of apprawl . 
of the toriff. One of the fundamenbl aspects remains undeter- 
mined, i f  the margin i s  not Frecisely defined. 
. , 
3 . 4  COMPATlBlLlZATlON OF POLICIES IN EACH COUNTRY 
3.4.1 FOREIGN INVESTMENT. 
STATUTE OF CAPITALS - DECISION 24 ClASSIFl(3ATION OF ENTERPRISES ' 
1 I t  relotes to the esbblishment of a system common to foreign capitals and, among 
1 others, regording trademarks, patents, llcenses and royalties. 
AMENDMENTS 
k t i o n a l :  
I t  owns more than 80% of national capital and 
self i n  the technical, financial, administrative 
By means of Decision 103 of 1976 the following amendments are made: 
thot said proportion reflects it- . 
and commercial management a. The percentage of profit remitttlnce i s  increased from 14% to 20%; 
of the enterprise. a greater percentage m y  be established according to  the %decision 
of each country. 
Mixed: 
Property or nutionals between 51% and 80% of the invested capital and re- b. The authorized reinvestment percentage is increased from 5% b 7%. 
f lecting whut i s  stated i n  the preceeding point. 
c. Investments o f  international ~ n u l t i  or bilateral financial or Cooper- . 
Foreign : - atlng agencies are regarded as neutml co i ta l  and consequently 
Foreign copitul exceeding 51% or when i t  reflects power from the foreign capital, they shall not be estimated neither _9T; as nationa nor as foreign i n  
the enterprise i n  which they partictpate. 
Two cases ore recognized to the efrects of Decision 24: 
a) For foreign enterprises existing a t  the moment of Decision 24 coming into 
effect, cption i s  given to: 
- Continue 0s foreign enterprises without poiticipoting i n  the advan- 
toges of the extended market. - Transform into national or mixed enterprises, gradually, within a term 
of 15 years. They would enjoy the advantoges of the extended market. 
b) New foreign enterprises are compelled to transform in to notional or mixed 
enterprires independently from their porticipoting or not i n  the extended 
mnrket. 
Limits established by Decision 24 to rationalize foreign investment: 
1 .  Obligation to establish an organism to control foreign investment i n  each 
country of the subregion, before which the foreign investment sh'ould be 
registered, and which w i l l  or w i l l  not approve i t  according to the 
criteria of each country. 
2. Control of the remittance o f  profih; limits are established at 14% 
annually over the invested capital. 
3.  Control o i  the reinvestment; l imit  i s  established at  5% annually over 
the invested capitol. 
Concessions : 
Foreign entctprises established i n  the sector of basic products (hydrocarbons -- 
l iquid and gaseous, minemls, goslInes, o i l  pipelines, forestry exploitations) dur- 
i ng  the first ten years of the statute's l i f e  may continue their activit ies as 
foreign enterprises under the system of concession~,provided that these do not 
exceed a term of 20 ywrs. 
Note: Whaii the partner o f  the foreign capital i s  the state wl th  no less than 
7 . , 
30%, enterp~ises are regarded as mixed provided thot the state has a d e t e r  
rninant capacity i n  the management of the enterprise. 
3.4 COMPATIBJLIZATION OF POLK IES IN EAC t I COUNTRY (Con. .) 
3.4.2 MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SUBREGIONAL CAPITAL 
By means of Decision 46, guidelines were set for the estublishement of multinational enterpriser, their fieid action was defined, as well as maximum 
and minimum percentages of participotion on the part of the shareholders as per their nationality, noms for their constitution and taxation, attributions 
of their directive divisions and the prerrogative that the countries would gmnt them. ,, 
Likewise, the treatment applicable to- the capital of subregional investors was determined; t h i s  w i l l  rule by the norms of Decision 46 when i t  participates 
in  multinational enterprises and by regdlations of Decision 24 in  other cases. The investment of subregion01 capital i s  regarded as national capital, which 
should be previously authorized by the competent authority of each country. 
3.4.3 TREATMENT TO CAF1s (ANDEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) INVESTMENTS AND TO ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE PARTICIPATES 
CAF1s direct investments, authorized and registered in  accordance with provisions of Decision 24, receive th9 same treatment as national capitals (Decision 
48). Enterprises in  which the stute or state agencies participate are considered as mixed i f  their proportion in  some I s  at lws t  30%, provided that decision- 
making capacity in  their management i s  kept (Decision 47). 
3.4.4 ADJUSTMENT DF 1 NDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATIONS 1 . .  ': 
I . .  ~ i c i s i o n  49 contains certain instructions for theadjustment of legislations on industriol development in the member countries, which are related to the 
. . following aspects and which, in certain cases, require specific regulations as yet not approved: 
a) Customs Tariff Policy - foresees the elimination of exemptions, reductions and restitutions of taxes on imports affecting the application of the common 
external tariff. Modalities for its compliance are established, as well as transitory exceptions and particular treatment i n  the case of Bolivia and Ecuador; 
b) Fiscal, exchange, monetary and firiilncial policies - instruments of industrial development related to these policies should be adjusted i n  accordance with 
the Cartogena Agreement. However, i t  i s  established that in matters of taxes, rates and other internal taxes, products originating i n  a member country 
sholl enjoy, in  the territory of the remaining countries, a treatment not less favorable than that applicable to similar national productr; 
c) Exports development - as long as no common norms are adapted, the countries may continue to apply thslr hotioml measures to exports directed to 
the subregion as well as to countries outside of it. 
d) Industrial development - joint actions i n  this field refer mainly to: , 
1 )  purchases mode by the cocntries; 
2) industrial information and ~esearch; 
3) tha rendering of engineering services and ;conomlc evaluation of on industrial nature; 
4) the formulating of technicui norms and the establishment of quality control systems; 
5) promotion and protection or development of subregional technology, and 
6) efficient util ization of foreign technology and control i n  the use of same. 
3.4. COMPATlBlLlZATlON OF POLICIES IN EAC tl COUNTRY (Con., .) 
3.4.5 TECHNOLOGICAL POLICY 
Decision 84 has passed legislation on tlrc following aspects: conceptual bases for a subregional of technological development, establishment of Andean 
programs of technological developmer~t and assistance to progroms as they relate to technology and to Decision 24 on foreign capitol and tmdemarks, patenh 
and royalties. The bases are as follovr: 
- To promote application of knowledge compatible with the soclo economic situation of the member countries. - To overcome the limitotions that condition the autonomy. - To produce their own technologies, adequate to the industrial development stage faced by the countries and to the supply of mw materials. - To utilize, jointly, human, financial, scientific, technical and infmstructvre resources. - To evaluate applicotions for the importation of technologies in  accordance with development needs and socio economic aspech, beoring i n  mind the 
following: 
a) Effects on the technological tlevelopment as the creation of demand for scientific and technological activities i n  the subregion, the utilization 
of local engineering and consultant services and the possible effects derived from the technology Incorporated into the project; 
b) Effects of technology on employment; 
c) Contribution to specific development plans which are of interest to the country or to the region; 
d) Effeck of the balance of payrr~ents ond genemtion of income, ond 
e) Effects on the environment. 
- .  To promote. generation and assimilation of technology in  their territories, giving preference to contmcting natuml persons, mixed nationol or Andean multi- 
national enterprises for research, consultant and advisory services and, in  the case of contmct with third countries, said services ihould be rendered with 
national or subregional participation. - To consider the effect of every sectorial program of industrial development on the technological development of the member countries, particularly as i t  
relates to the creation of scientific-technological demand and with the adequate incorporotion of new technologies seeking jointly the altermtives. - To prepore qualified personnel for the study, assemblage, management and execution of industrial proiectr related to the program. - To establish a subregional system of technologicol information, capable of identifying alternative sources in  the international market and determining the 
best negotiating conditions. - To insure participotion of the Andean Development Corporotion in activities derived from the common technological policy. 
From a practical point of view, special technologicol development programs have been adopted i n  the areas of copper meta(lurgy and of development of 
tropical forest01 resources. 
3.4.6 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY POLICY 
With the approwl of Decision 85, the common regulation for the application of norms on Industrial property has been establlshed, whereby Important conceptual 
advances have been Introduced as to invention potenh, industrial drawings and models and trade names or servlces. Likewise, I t  regulates patent requiremenh' . 
for the registration of tmdemarks, proceedings and procedures and the rights and obligations conferred by trademarks and patents. 
3.4.7 FISCAL AND TAX POLICY 
In this field, by means of Decision 40, the Agreement to avoid double taxing among member countrles and the Type Agreement to avoid double taxing among 
member countries and states alien to the subregion, were approved. These agreements ratify the exclusive right of the source country to tox the income and 
patrimony of enterprises and persons. 
3.4.8 COMM?RCIAL COMPETITION 
, . , .  Decision 45 was app~oved as an initial apprwch to the subiect, containing some norms to prevent or correct pmctices that m y  distort competition within the 
subregion, whether from the territory of member countries or from a third country. A procedure is estaD!i:hed to solve concrete problems but I t  it admitted 
that based on experience obtained in  tile development of the integration process, more pnctse norms shoulci be odopted to allow the identirimtion, prevention . . .  . . . . , * , ,  , 
. , . , and correction of such pmctlces of disl.;yal competition. , . . , I  
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COUNTRY ' S EXT'REME POSITIONS IN' RELATION TO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Country's pos i t ions  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  devclopnent s t r a t egy  
I, ONE EAXTR13ME: 
Free Marlcct Forces: ( 1 )  Colombia and ( 2 )  Chile 
Lock of i n t e r n a l  savings (2) :  denatiorinl izat ion of enterpr ises  i ndus t r i e s  ; a t t r a c t i o n  of fore ign c a p i t a l  
Less emphasis i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n :  (1) and ( 2 )  
- r e j e c t i on  of import 's  subs t i t u t i on  - back t o  comparative advantages of 4;raditional d iv i s i on  of .labour 
- lrrinimize publ ic  s e c t o r  p m t i c i p a t i o n :  a f f e c t s  PSDI's e f f i c i ency  
- progrmmed indus t r i e s  a r e  not p r i o r i t y  
- economic po l icy  i s  agains t  them 
11. OTHER EXTREME: 
Increased Pa r t i c i pa t i on  i n  Planning c'nd Programming from t h e  Par t  of t h e  Andean Pact  and  t h e  Public Sector:  ( 5 )  Peru and 
( 6 )  Venezuela -
For d i f f e r e n t  reasons development s t r a t e g i e s  coincide.  Supporters of: 
- PSDI 
- High U C  
( 6 )  - Avai lab i l i ty  of f i n a n c i a l  resources i n  hands o f  government - Inc ip ien t  i n d u s t r i a l  development 
- Andean Pact  = chance t o  becomc indus t r i a l i z ed  
extended and protected markets I 
( 5 )  - Development of ba s i c  and s t r a t e g i c  i ndus t r i e s  a r e  c r u c i a l  t o  break "dependent?" 
111. IN THE MIDDLE,, c l o se r  t o  ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  
(3 )  Bol iv ia  and ( 4 )  Ecuador 
- Low indust  r ial  development : 
Depend on imngrts 
Mono-exporters of primary goods - Require i n t eg ra t i on  f o r  p lacing dynzmic i ndus t r i e s  PSDI's bene f i t s  h igher  than  coscS 
- Intermediate AEC l eve l s  (3)  
Note: Chile ( 2 )  and Bol ivia  (3)  a r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  a t t r a c t e d  by south cone ( ~ r a z i l )  (Change In U.S. s t r a t egy :  s t reng th  ~ r s z i l  and 
Mexico as po l e s ) .  The r e s t  ( l ) ,  ( k ) ,  ( 5 )  and ( 6 ) ,  be l i eve  i n  t h e  convenience of t h e  Andean Pact  geopo l i t i c a l  d iv i s ion ,  
